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I. Introduction
Commercial speech is no longer the stepchild of the
First Amendment.

Long all but ignored and summarily

excluded from the prestigious reach of one of our most
foundational constitutional guarantees,1 commercial speech
took its first major step towards validation in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
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1

See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54

(1942) (summarily rejecting First Amendment protection for
commercial speech).

For a description of the early history

of the commercial speech doctrine, see Ronald D. Rotunda,
The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976
U. Ill. L.F. 1080 (1976).
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Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.2

But as

significant as Virginia Board was as a historical and
doctrinal matter, it left much to be desired as a coherent
statement of First Amendment theory.

It was likely this

failure that led to the stark second-class status and
treatment the concept received for the better part of two
decades.3 Today, the situation in the trenches appears to be
dramatically different.

In every recent commercial speech

case decided by the Supreme Court, the First Amendment

2

425 U.S. 748, 770-73 (1976) (holding that truthful

commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment).
3

See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox,

492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (keeping the protection afforded
to commercial speech subordinate to that afforded to noncommercial speech by refusing to impose a "least
restrictive means" standard); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass’n., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (“[C]ommercial speech
[enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with
its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment
values . . . .”).
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argument prevailed.4

These results are in sharp contrast to

the much more hit-or-miss record of the pro-commercial
speech cause in earlier years.

While it would be incorrect

to suggest that commercial speech is today deemed fungible
with fully protected speech in all contexts,5 it is at least
true that the gap between the two is far narrower than it
was in 1976.
Despite this significant alteration in judicial
outcomes, certain aspects of the modern commercial speech
debate are, sadly, much the same as before.

For one thing,

the Court at least purports to be applying the “First

4

See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357,

377 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,
566 (2001).
5

For example, false commercial speech is automatically

excluded from the scope of the First Amendment.

Compare

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (stating that for commercial speech to
come within the First Amendment’s protection, it “must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading”), with N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)
(explaining that certain categories of false non-commercial
speech receive the protection of the “actual malice” test).
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Amendment Lite” type of protection that it first adopted in
its famed four-part Central Hudson test in 1980.

It does

so, despite the fact that the end results of what is
supposedly the same commercial speech-specific test are now
far more protective than they once were.

Moreover,

respected scholars have long conducted a form of guerilla
warfare on commercial speech protection.

Some object to

the extension of any First Amendment protection at all.6
Others have made clear their objection, not to the
extension of any level of First Amendment protection, but
rather to the extension of full First Amendment protection,
a standard that — preposterously, they believe — would
treat commercial advertising, for constitutional purposes,
interchangeably with the works of Shakespeare, Martin
Luther King’s “I have a dream” sermon or William Jennings
Bryan’s famed “cross of gold” speech.7

6

E.g., C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization:

Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish’s The Value of
Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 646, 652-57 (1982); see
discussion infra Part II.C.1.d.
7

See, e.g., Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of

Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 27 (2000) (discussing
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The nature of these scholarly attacks on commercial
speech protection can be placed within three broad
categories: (1) rationalist, (2) intuitionist, and (3)
ideological.

Arguments included in the first category put

forward specific reasons that, as a matter of First
Amendment theory and principle, commercial speech is to be
deemed undeserving of First Amendment protection, or at
least as much protection as given to more traditionally
protected forms of expression.

Those arguments falling

within the second category appeal, rather, to some
intuitive notion as to what free expression is all about,
concluding, on the basis of a synthesis of those
intuitions, that commercial speech is undeserving of full
protection.

Those that fall into the third category differ

from those in the first two categories in that they are
openly grounded on the perceived evils of the economic
system of which commercial speech is a part.
In this Article, I will demonstrate that, to all too
great an extent, all three forms of criticism of commercial
speech suffer from the same fundamental flaw: each either
constitutes, facilitates, or, at the very least comes,

the difference between public discourse and commercial
speech).
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dangerously close to a constitutionally impermissible —
indeed, constitutionally destructive — form of viewpointbased regulation.

As such, they each give rise, ironically

in the name of the First Amendment, to the most universally
condemned threat to the foundations of free expression —
suppression based on the regulators’ subjective
disagreement with or disdain for the views being expressed.8
To be sure, the three forms of attack on commercial
speech protection differ significantly in how they
ultimately reach their end result of viewpoint regulation.
Criticisms that fall within the third category, for
example, are refreshingly candid in their ideological cast,
and it is therefore mercifully easy to expose their true

8

The one arguable exception to my critique are those free

speech theorists who exclude protection of commercial
speech because they believe that the First Amendment
protects only purely political expression and who,
therefore, exclude all forms of non-political speech,
including literature, art and science, as well as
commercial speech.

While I believe that such an approach

is grossly underprotective as a matter of First Amendment
theory, it would be incorrect to view it as a form of
viewpoint regulation.

See infra Part V.
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nature.

They are avowedly premised on acceptance of a

particular political or ideological perspective that is
hostile to capitalism and its logical outgrowths or
implications.

There is, of course, no reason in the world

that scholars cannot vigorously attack all of the evils of
capitalism and commercialism, and argue that the logical
result is that speech that fosters or furthers such an
economic system should be disdained.

The problem is that

these arguments are made not merely on a normative
political level as part of a broader substantive debate,
but rather as a basis on which to determine the reach of
the First Amendment.

Such a practice is a risky endeavor

for those on both sides of any normative political issue.
Any student of free expression should be able to explain
that the level of constitutional protection extended to
expression cannot be determined by the extent to which the
regulator agrees or disagrees with the views expressed.
Adoption of such an approach would automatically transform
First Amendment interpretation into a political state of
nature.

For whoever controls the official channels of

constitutional interpretation would then be permitted to
exclude from the First Amendment’s scope any expression
which they happen to deem deeply immoral or offensive.

As

is so often the case in constitutional law, then, we should
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warn those who want to exclude commercial speech from the
First Amendment’s scope because they condemn the
commercialism of which it is an outgrowth: “Be careful what
you wish for.”
The other two categories are somewhat more complex
and therefore more difficult to characterize as a form of
invidious viewpoint regulation.

Indeed, attacks in the

first category appear, at least superficially, to represent
the very opposite of an unprincipled, politically motivated
approach to First Amendment interpretation.

To the

contrary, they appear to be grounded in a form of objective
and principled constitutional analysis.

It is my position,

however, that all such claimed principled justifications
are fatally and illogically underinclusive.

In each case

the justification asserted to support reduced protection
for commercial speech applies with equal force to one or
more categories of non-commercial expression that are still
assumed to receive full First Amendment protection.

Thus,

what superficially appears to constitute a plausible and
principled rationale for reducing protection for commercial
speech in reality applies its basis for reduced protection,
irrationally and unjustifiably, to commercial but not to
various forms of fully protected non-commercial speech.
Careful analysis demonstrates that if the asserted criteria
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are employed properly as principled, legitimate, and
consistently applied grounds on which to reduce
constitutional protection, then logically they should also
lead to the exclusion or reduction of protection for the
parallel non-commercial speech category saddled with the
identical flaw.

On the other hand, if the asserted

rationale is assumed not to justify reduced protection for
various forms of non-commercial speech, then logically it
should be equally insufficient to justify reduced
protection for commercial speech.

It is this very point

that lies at the core of Herbert Wechsler’s famed “neutral
principles” analysis: once a court that is interpreting and
applying a constitutional provision has chosen a principled
basis for decision, it may not selectively ignore that
principle in subsequent cases when its use would lead to
politically distasteful conclusions.9

Rather, for judicial

legitimacy to be maintained, the constitutional principle
must be applied neutrally in all situations to which that
principle applies.10

9

Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of

Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 15-16 (1959).
10

Id.

Page 9 of 140 - Final Production Day

It does not automatically follow, of course, that the
inconsistent and selective application of what are, in the
abstract, rational criteria constitutes viewpoint-based
regulation.

Indeed, on occasion some of the strongest

opponents of commercial speech protection have come from
the political right — hardly the place from which one would
normally fear anti-capitalist viewpoint-based regulation.11
However, these commentators’ or jurists’ views can largely
be explained on the basis of their consistent — if arguably
misguided — underprotectiveness of free expression.

My

concern over indirect or furtive viewpoint-based
discrimination, rather, focuses on scholars and jurists who
are normally associated with a generally more protective
approach towards free expression.

It is their logically

indefensible refusal to extend full protection to
commercial speech that, I believe, is appropriately seen as
viewpoint driven.
Strategically selective application of abstract
principles is often associated with furtive or indirect
forms of viewpoint-based regulation.

For example, imagine

a Chicago city ordinance that makes it a crime to
distribute anti-war literature on Michigan Avenue during

11

See infra note 140.
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rush hour.

The asserted justification for the regulation

is the viewpoint-neutral contention that distribution of
literature at this particular time and place would be
disruptive to important governmental interests, such as
safety and traffic flow.

Such a viewpoint-neutral

rationale may or may not justify speech regulation.

The

answer to that question turns on a complex assessment of
numerous criteria and is well beyond the scope of this
article.

In the hypothetical ordinance, however, the

validity of this asserted rationale is beside the point,
because the identical harm would result from distribution
of pro-war literature or, for that matter, any type of
literature.

The fatally underinclusive nature of the

ordinance’s limitation inexorably leads to the conclusion
that the ordinance is effectively viewpoint based.

A

similar analysis, I believe, is equally applicable to the
fatally underinclusive justifications for reduced
protection for commercial speech.
The remaining category of commercial speech
opposition, which I have labeled “intuitionist,” amounts to
neither direct viewpoint-based discrimination nor furtive,
indirect viewpoint discrimination.

However, because of its

inherently non-rational nature, intuitionist analysis may
easily serve as either a catalyst or a cover for the
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implementation of such invidious discrimination.

It is

thus appropriately seen as an “enabler” of viewpoint
discrimination.

One can easily assert that one’s own First

Amendment intuition leads to the exclusion or reduction of
constitutional protection for commercial speech.

But

because by definition an intuitionist justification need
not be grounded in rational argument, such intuition may
derive (consciously or subconsciously) from a background
political or ideological prejudice against either
commercial speech itself or the capitalist economic system
in which it functions.

Equally troubling is the threat

which such anti-intellectual “grunting” causes to every
aspect of First Amendment thought, right down to its core,
for intuitionist justifications are inherently immune to
any form of rational critique.
Even if one were to accept everything I have written
to this point, there would nevertheless exist a pervasive
analytical obstacle to characterizing any or all of these
rationales as viewpoint discriminations.

Classical

viewpoint discrimination selectively regulates (or
protects) speech on the basis of regulatory hostility to a
specific social, political or moral position sought to be
expressed by the speaker.

This pathology, for the most

part, is not technically true of commercial speech

Page 12 of 140 - Final Production Day

regulation, even when the reduced protection is openly
grounded in hostility to commercial expression as a whole.
By the Court’s own definition, commercial speech promotes
sale of a product or service.12

Such expression, therefore,

does not express a political, social or moral viewpoint; if
it did, it would no longer be appropriately classified as
commercial speech.

One may therefore challenge my

characterization of hostility to commercial speech as a
form of viewpoint-based discrimination.

At most, the

argument could be made that commercial speech regulation
constitutes a form of subject matter discrimination, a far
less invidious — indeed, often readily accepted — type of
constitutional classification.

While I fully recognize

this potential difficulty, I nevertheless conclude that any
approach grounded in hostility to commercial speech is
appropriately viewed not as subject matter categorization,
but rather as viewpoint-based discrimination.

I reach this

conclusion, because I believe such hostility falls within a
“twilight zone” category of viewpoint discrimination that,
while not conceptually identical to traditional viewpoint-

12

See infra note 21; see, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug

Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
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based regulation, gives rise to much the same invidious
threat to the foundations of free expression.
This Article contains three main sections.

The

initial section describes the three categories of arguments
usually relied upon to justify a reduced level of
protection for commercial speech.13

The following section

explores the nature of viewpoint discrimination and the
reasons why, as a matter of constitutional and political
theory, such discrimination must be categorically rejected
as a basis for First Amendment analysis.14

The final

section integrates the first two sections by demonstrating
that each of the categorical bases for reducing or
rejecting First Amendment protection for commercial speech
is, in one way or another, appropriately characterized as a
form of invidious and constitutionally impermissible
viewpoint discrimination.15

II. The Arguments For Reduced Commercial Speech Protection:
A Categorical Approach
A. Defining Commercial Speech

13

See infra Part II.

14

See infra Part III.

15

See infra Part IV.
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Until relatively late in the twentieth century,
neither court nor scholar had invested virtually any effort
in fashioning a defense of the summary exclusion of
commercial speech protection from the scope of First
Amendment protection.16

It was simply assumed, without

explanation or support, that commercial speech fell within
the area of far less protected property rights, rather than
constitutionally protected expression.17

Since the Supreme

Court’s decision to extend at least some level of First
Amendment protection to commercial speech, a scholarly
cottage industry on the subject has mushroomed.

Some of it

has advocated full, or at least substantial, First
Amendment protection.18

16

Much of it — likely the

See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)

(summarily rejecting First Amendment protection for
commercial speech).
17

Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression

414 (1970) (“The rule that communications in the
‘commercial sector’ of our society are outside the system
of freedom of expression . . . has been widely observed,
[but] has never been fully explained.”).
18

Much of that scholarship has been my own.

See Martin H.

Redish, Money Talks: Speech, Economic Power, and the Values
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overwhelming majority — has rejected full or, on occasion,
any First Amendment protection for commercial speech.19
Before I can attempt to achieve my goal of categorizing and
deconstructing the arguments against full First Amendment
protection for commercial speech, however, it is necessary
to define the concept.

The term, it seems, is not self-

defining, and how one chooses to define “commercial speech”
has a potentially enormous impact on the validity of the
attacks on its protection.20

of Democracy 14-62 (2001) [hereinafter Redish, Money
Talks]; Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the
Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free
Expression, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 429, 431-48 (1971); see
also Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of
Commercial Speech?, 76 Va. L. Rev. 627, 648-52 (1990)
(arguing that commercial speech should be afforded the same
protection as noncommercial speech).
19

E.g., C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the

Theory of Freedom, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 3 (1976) (“[A]
complete denial of first amendment protection for
commercial speech is not only consistent with, but is
required by, first amendment theory.”).
20

See infra Part II.C.1.b-d.
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While the Supreme Court has cryptically offered a
number of different — and not always consistent —
definitions of commercial speech,21 for all practical
purposes the alternatives come down to two: (1) speech
concerning commercial products or services,22 or (2) speech

21

See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,

447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980) (defining commercial speech as
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker” and “speech proposing a commercial transaction”);
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67
(1983) (holding that an advertisement does not constitute
commercial speech merely because of its form, references to
a product name, or because it derives from economic
motivation, but rather because of a combination of all of
these characteristics).

Compare Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54

(defining commercial advertising as commercial speech),
with Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973) (“[S]peech is not
rendered commercial by the mere fact that it relates to an
advertisement.”).
22

This was the definition I assumed when, prior to the

Court’s extension of meaningful First Amendment protection
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advocating the sale of commercial products or services (the
definition on which the Court appears to have settled).23
Under the first alternative, all expression concerning the
quality, efficiency, or safety of products or services for
sale, regardless of the speaker, would receive reduced or
no protection.

Thus, both a manufacturer’s speech

advocating a product’s sale and a consumer protection
advocate’s speech criticizing the product would be deemed
less protected commercial speech.24

Under the second

to commercial speech, I argued that commercial speech
deserved such protection.
23

See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,

553-54 (2001) (stating courts have recognized the
“distinction between speech proposing a commercial
transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject
to government regulation, and other varieties of speech”
(quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562)).
24

The issue becomes significantly more problematic, of

course, once the debate begins to concern possible
government regulation of commercial products or services,
because at that point the speech could arguably be deemed
political in nature.

This fact, however, simply
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alternative, in contrast, it is only speech motivated by
the seller’s goal of direct financial gain through sale
that falls within the supposedly “second class” category of
commercial expression.25

Both alternatives represent

linguistically plausible definitions of the phrase.

While

the first alternative is, however, at least theoretically
conceivable, at no point has the Court ever chosen to
employ it.

It is probably reasonable to conclude that, at

this point, the Court has unambiguously adopted the view
that commercial speech is confined to expression advocating
purchase.26
In categorizing, analyzing and critiquing the various
arguments relied upon to reject full First Amendment

underscores the difficulty of attempting to segregate
commercial speech as a self-contained category.
25

See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer

Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 785 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67 (explaining that
since speech is part of the promotion of a sale it is
relevant to the determination of commercial speech).
26

See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 366-68

(2002).
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protection for commercial speech,27 it is essential that we

27

It should be noted that unless otherwise specified, when

I refer to commercial speech in the course of this Article,
I intend to include only truthful, non-misleading
expression.

There are a number of significant arguments

growing out of the question of First Amendment protection
for false or misleading commercial expression.

See, e.g.,

Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial
Speech, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 37-41 (2000); Martin H. Redish,
Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific
Expression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43
Vand. L. Rev. 1433, 1443 (1990).

In prior writing, I have

argued that false commercial speech, much like most false
political speech, should be measured by the “actual malice”
test of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280
(1964).

See Redish, Money Talks supra note 18, at 55-56.

Thus, for reasons I have explained elsewhere, I ultimately
conclude that even false commercial speech is to be treated
fungibly with false non-commercial speech.
56.

See id. at 53-

For purposes of intellectual simplicity, however, my

critique in this Article is aimed exclusively at arguments
made for providing reduced or no First Amendment protection
for even wholly truthful commercial speech.
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recognize that those scholars who have advocated this
position have done so on the assumption that commercial
speech is confined to expression promoting sale.28

Indeed,

in a number of instances the fact of sale promotion is
central to the argument for reduced protection.29

Thus, it

should always be kept in mind that the very same scholars
who urge reduced protection for commercial speech are at
the same time proceeding on the assumption that expression
criticizing the quality, safety, efficiency, or value of
commercial products or services receives full
constitutional protection.
B. Understanding the Nature of Principled
Constitutional Analysis: The Two Levels of Normative
Inquiry
Many years ago, Herbert Wechsler, in his famed article
on “neutral principles,” provided the modern basis for the
argument that constitutional interpretation must, at its
foundation, rest on principle.30

Though the article clearly

suffers from a number of flaws and has been the victim of

28

See, e.g., Baker, supra note 19, at 3.

29

See discussion infra Part II.C.1.b-d.

30

Wechsler, supra note 9, at 16.
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often vigorous, and sometimes misguided, attack,31 it
properly remains the starting point for any argument that
constitutional interpretation must ultimately be grounded
in principled analysis.
Anyone who seeks to defend the need for principled
analysis in constitutional interpretation, of course, bears
an obligation to explain the difference between principled
and unprincipled interpretation, which is not an easy task.
Indeed, Professor Wechsler was largely agnostic on the
question of how to choose a “principled” interpretation of
a constitutional provision in the first place.32

However,

Wechsler’s greatest — albeit today largely ignored —

31

E.g., Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of

Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 661 passim (1960); Jon O. Newman, Between Legal
Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of
Institutional Values, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 200, 202-08 (1984);
Benjamin F. Wright, The Supreme Court Cannot Be Neutral, 40
Tex. L. Rev. 599 passim (1962).
32

See generally Wechsler, supra note 9, at 11-19 (arguing

that courts should rely on principled analysis that
transcends the immediate case, but providing no criteria
for courts to follow).
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contribution was to point out what perhaps should have been
(but often has not been) obvious in any event: to satisfy
the requirements of principle, a constitutional
interpretation must be applied neutrally.33

In other words,

whatever rationale a court selects to justify its chosen
interpretive doctrine must be applied consistently in all
cases; it cannot be selectively altered in subsequent cases
solely because the court finds the outcome dictated by use
of that principle to be politically distasteful or
offensive.

Wechsler’s insight, then, can play a valuable

role in constitutional analysis, even if one remains
uncertain of how to choose the applicable interpretive
principle in the first place.

His primary concern was not

with the shaping of the principle, but in maintaining the
principle’s consistent application once it has been adopted
in the initial case.
In important ways, portions of the First Amendment
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination grow out of a
Wechslerian concern for principle.

When a regulation of

expression is justified on the ground that the regulated
expression possesses quality X, the fact that the
regulation fails to include within its prohibitory reach

33

Id. at 15.
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other expression that also possesses quality X
automatically renders the regulation, if not
unconstitutional, then at least constitutionally suspect.
This is so even if one were to assume that a regulation of
all the expression characterized by X would satisfy the
First Amendment.

The constitutional flaw is that the

regulation is irrationally underinclusive, and therefore
discriminatory.
It is important to understand that parallel
underinclusiveness analysis applies to selective expressive
protection, as well as to selective expressive suppression.
Phrased in Wechslerian terms, when the principle of First
Amendment interpretation chosen by a reviewing court as a
basis for excluding the regulated expression from the
protective scope of the First Amendment simultaneously
affects other types of speech that the court in subsequent
cases chooses to protect, the court has failed to apply its
interpretive principle in a neutral manner.

Of course,

nothing in Wechslerian jurisprudence would logically
prevent a reviewing court from deciding to alter its
underlying interpretive principle (putting issues of
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constitutional stare decisis to the side).34

Thus, the

court could now decide that it had been incorrect, in its
prior decision, in believing that expression is
disqualified from the First Amendment’s scope because it is
characterized by X.

Such an alteration in principle,

however, would logically dictate a reversal of the decision
not to extend protection to the regulated expression in the
initial case; a failure to do so would lead to swimming
halfway across a river, intellectually speaking.

The court

could, on the other hand, now decide that while X is not an
appropriate basis on which to determine First Amendment
protection, Y does provide such a basis, and the speech not
protected in the initial case is characterized by Y while
the speech the court chose to protect in the second case is
not.

If so, however, the court would obviously have to be

explicit in its change in underlying decisional principle.
Absent such an explicit change in governing principle,
exclusion of the expression in case one from the First
Amendment’s scope, combined with the protective inclusion

34

See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,

979-84 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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of similarly characterized expression in case two, is
inescapably unprincipled.
When a reviewing court is guilty of such inconsistency
in application of its chosen interpretive principle, two
conceivable explanations exist: (1) the court simply fails
to recognize or grasp the inconsistency, or (2) the court
is making a conscious (albeit concealed) choice to apply
its principle selectively because it dislikes the regulated
speech in the initial case but is favorably disposed to the
regulated speech in the second case.
no third alternative.

There appears to be

The reviewing court could, perhaps,

candidly acknowledge that it is refusing to protect the
expression in case one, not because of any neutrally
applied precept of First Amendment analysis but simply
because it finds the substance of the speech politically or
morally offensive.

For example, the court could

conceivably assert, quite openly, that its “principle” of
First Amendment interpretation is that the speech of
Socialists, or Fascists, or Communists or (fill in name of
hated group here) is so offensive as to exclude itself from
constitutional protection.35

35

Applying this form of

See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127-28

(1959).
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principled analysis, the court would be quite consistent in
deciding not to protect the speech in case one but to
protect the speech in case two.

Such an approach to First

Amendment interpretation, however, is impermissible.

It

represents not a good faith attempt to reconcile and apply
the competing historical, textual and normative factors
required by principled First Amendment analysis, but rather
a thinly veiled attempt by those in power to use the First
Amendment as a weapon to undermine the freedom of thought
and expression underlying that very constitutional
protection.
One may better understand this interpretive dichotomy
by dissecting the reasoning that enters into the shaping of
both levels of constitutional analysis.

On the first

level, the interpreter is seeking to glean an appropriate
normative guide from the value or synthesis of values
underlying the First Amendment.

To be sure, reasonable

people may differ over what the correct underlying value or
values actually are, or the correct translation from value
to doctrine, but in each situation the interpreter is
seeking to decipher the deep constitutional structure
underlying the words of the First Amendment.

On the second

level, the interpreter cares not at all about the deep
structural value or values underlying the protection of
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free expression, but instead reflexively draws a
superficial, unsupported and manipulative equation between
those values and the exclusion of what she deems
politically offensive speech.

But in the end, interpreters

operating on this narrower political level are concerned
not at all with what the First Amendment is all about.
They are focused, rather, on how to suppress the speech
they find politically offensive, and manipulatively
interpret the First Amendment toward that end.

C. The Three Categories of Commercial Speech
Opposition
With this structural background established, it is now
appropriate to turn to explication of the three categories
of justifications for the extension of reduced or no
protection to commercial speech.

Those three categories,

it should be recalled, are (1) rationalist, (2)
intuitionist, and (3) ideological.

It should be emphasized

that this categorization is solely my own.

No one, to my

knowledge, has ever even attempted to categorize the anticommercial speech arguments, much less chosen the specific
categories that I have selected.

Since none of the

scholars who opposes full First Amendment protection for
commercial speech has ever expressly categorized his own
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arguments in the manner I suggest, it is conceivable that
particular scholars will object to my classification of
their work.

In each case, however, I believe that all of

those opposing full commercial speech protection fit with
surprising ease into one of my three categories.
1. Rationalist Grounds
What I describe as rationalist grounds for opposition
to First Amendment protection for commercial speech include
those reasons that purport to be based on principled
interpretation of the amendment — in other words, efforts
to construe and implement the values underlying the
constitutional provision.

To the extent these reasons

justify exclusion of commercial speech, then, at least
superficially, they do so not because of political
opposition to commercial speech, but rather simply because
commercial speech does not adequately further First
Amendment values.

I have discerned six conceivable

rationalist grounds: (1) absence of relevance to the
political process; (2) motivational heartiness; (3) the
speech-action dichotomy; (4) the corporate nature of the
speaker; (5) speaker self-interest; and (6) regulatory
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motivation.36

Closer analysis of each of these asserted

rationalist grounds, however, readily exposes the grossly
underinclusive nature of all of them.
a. Absence of Relevance to the Political
Process
Although Professor Farber is undoubtedly incorrect
when he asserts that “[e]veryone seems to agree that
political speech lies at the core of the First Amendment’s
protection,”37 it is certainly true that a number of leading
36

Note that in shaping these rationales, I draw on the

analysis first developed in my book, Money Talks.

See

Redish, Money Talks, supra note 18, at 31-53.
37

Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public

Choice and the First Amendment, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 562
(1991).

At the very least, he is incorrect to the extent I

am included among the description of “[e]veryone.”

See

generally Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130
U. Pa. L. Rev. 591 (1982) [hereinafter Redish, The Value of
Free Speech] (arguing that non-political speech, like
political speech, fosters self-realization value).

Other

commentators who reject the view described by Farber also
seem not to fall within Professor Farber’s description of
“[e]veryone.”

See generally Kozinski & Banner, supra note

18 (arguing that the commercial/noncommercial distinction
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First Amendment scholars have advocated this view.38

If one

were to define “commercial speech” as speech concerning
commercial products or services, I suppose one starting
from the premise that the First Amendment is primarily or
exclusively designed to protect speech relevant to the
political process would logically conclude that commercial
speech is deserving of little or no First Amendment
protection.

I have attacked this view as flawed because it

fails to determine the normative reasons our system would

“makes no sense”); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964, 966
(1978) (“Speech is protected not as a means to a collective
good but because of the value of speech conduct to the
individual.”).
38

See generally, Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its

Relation to Self Government 93-94 (Lawbook Exchange Ltd
2001) (1948) (arguing that the First Amendment only
protects "speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon
issues with which voters have to deal – only, therefore, to
the consideration of matters of public interest”); Robert
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 Ind. L.J. 1, 27-28 (1971) (advocating constitutional
protection only to expressly political speech).
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choose democracy in the first place.39

Examination of that

question, I have asserted, establishes that speech
concerning commercial products and services can facilitate
private self-government in much the same way that political
speech fosters collective self-government.40

Both private

and collective self-government are grounded in identical
normative concerns about self-development and selfdetermination.41

Therefore, I have concluded that it makes

absolutely no sense to protect speech relevant to a
situation where the individual has a miniscule fraction of
a say in the outcome while simultaneously refusing to
protect speech that will facilitate choices by the private
individual that are solely her own.42

39

See Redish, Money Talks, supra note 18, at 22-29.

40

Id.

41

See Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Expression: A Critical

Analysis 19-29 (1984).
42

See id.

At the oral symposium, Professor Shiffrin

asserted that the key to the democratic process is
participation, rather than self-government.

Steven

Shiffrin, Remarks at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Symposium: Commercial Speech: Past, Present, and Future
(Feb. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Symposium Remarks].
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All of this is rendered completely moot, however, once
one chooses to define commercial speech not in terms of its
subject, but rather exclusively in terms of the motivation
of the speaker.

If, as the Supreme Court currently

maintains,43 commercial speech refers only to speech that
advocates purchase, there exists a great deal of expression
concerning commercial goods and services that is not
relegated to the second class status given to commercial
advertising.

The magazine Consumer Reports, as well as

consumer advocate groups, talk predominantly, if not
exclusively, about the relative merits of countless
commercial goods and services.
It might be argued that, unlike the expression of the
commercial advertisers, speech of Consumer Reports and
consumer advocate groups is presumably objective.

But that

fact, even if assumed to be accurate, surely has nothing to

However, it is difficult for me to comprehend what possible
value participation could have completely divorced from the
interest in self-determination.

Participation is a rather

hollow activity, absent some say in the final choice.
43

See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see, e.g.,

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67
(1983).
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do with the characterization of the expression as political
or non-political.

Thus, it is at least arguable that a

preference for political speech protection could logically
lead to reduced protection, or even an absence of
protection, for speech about the merits of commercial
products and services.44

44

It would, however, amount to a

Even this assertion is questionable, since it assumes

that somehow we are able to separate expression into neat,
severable units in which we can easily distinguish between
political and commercial speech.

This ignores the fact

that expression about commercial products and services
often simultaneously implicates traditionally protected
expressive categories such as political or scientific
speech.
In his response to this Article, Professor Weinstein
suggests that while the First Amendment is appropriately
deemed to be about speech concerning the political process,
even non-political information may be thought of as having
a distinct (if secondary) informational value.

James

Weinstein, Fool, Knaves & the Production of Commercial
Speech: A Response to Professor Redish 41 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
<<Part II.B>> (2007).

For that reason, Consumer Reports

may deserve constitutional protection because of the
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benefit of the information it supplies about commercial
products and services.

This reasoning is curious, since

the very premise of his First Amendment theory is that it
is speech that represents participation in the political
process that has constitutional value.

But if this is

true, how can he conclusively assert that in some
instances, even purely non-political expression is
deserving of protection?

He has failed to explain why

information unrelated to public discourse should receive
First Amendment protection, when his rationale for First
Amendment protection focuses solely on the value of public
discourse.

Moreover, if we are to assume that such

expression untied to public discourse is, in fact,
deserving of protection, how do we know that the level of
protection it deserves is less than that deserved by public
discourse?

Professor Weinstein seems merely to assume both

points, without the slightest explanatory rationale for
either.

In addition, if we are to grant Weinstein both of

his wholly unsupported postulates — i.e., that non-public
discourse informational speech is worthy of constitutional
protection, but that level of protection is for some reason
less than that given to public discourse — how can he
possibly make the wholly unsupported ex ante empirical
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assumption that Consumer Reports has informational value
but all commercial advertising lacks such value?

At the

very least, wouldn’t he logically need to permit a showing
of regulated advertising’s informational value in the
individual case?
Finally, if Professor Weinstein is so willing to
excise non-informational or incomplete non-political speech
from the First Amendment’s protective scope, one might
reasonably ask why even speech that contributes to public
discourse is not measured by the same standards.

His

response, apparently, is that the value of political speech
is not its informational benefit but rather some sort of
personal catharsis of the speaker that comes from the very
act of participation.
questions arise.

But if this is so, a number of

First, one may wonder why he so quickly

provides secondary status to the constitutional value of
political information to the voter.

Second, one may also

wonder why he assumes — once again, without the slightest
empirical support — that the commercial speaker is more
likely than the political speaker to be motivated by
personal gain, rather than by a desire to obtain the
benefits that flow exclusively from the very act of
participation.

The First Amendment, after all, has hardly
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total non-sequitur to suggest that because we give primacy
to political speech, we should reduce protection for
commercial advertising but not for non-promotional comments
about commercial products and services.

Neither has any

more to do with the political process than the other.
Thus, reliance on a political speech preference as a

been deemed the preserve of those on the level of Mother
Theresa.

Underscoring the mystery of Weinstein’s

assumption is the fact that he no doubt extends full First
Amendment protection to large corporate enterprises who
publish newspapers and political magazines.

Presumably

their motivation is not personal catharsis as much as it is
corporate profit.

As a concluding aside, I am really

curious what implications Weinstein’s political
participation theory has for speech that is characterized
as literature, art, music and science.

If he would, in

fact, extend full protection to them, one may reasonably
wonder why commercial speech is somehow less deserving of
protection, since none of them directly implicates the
democratic process.

If, on the other hand, he would not

extend literature, art, music and science full protection,
it is likely that most reasonable observers would deem his
approach far too narrow in its reach.
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principled basis for rejecting protection for commercial
advertising breaks down.

It is easily revealed to be an

irrationally underinclusive, and therefore unprincipled,
ground for distinguishing commercial from non-commercial
expression for purposes of First Amendment protection.
b.

Motivational Heartiness

In choosing to extend substantial constitutional
protection to commercial speech for the first time, the
Virginia Board Court emphasized that there existed
“commonsense differences” between commercial speech and
traditionally protected expression.45

Chief among these is

that “[s]ince advertising is the sine qua non of commercial
profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by
proper regulation.”46

The existence of the profit motive,

in other words, provides a heartiness to commercial speech
that makes it more resistant to chilling regulation.
Putting the same point in the terms of public choice
theory, Professor Farber has suggested that commercial
speech is “[a]t the periphery” of the First Amendment,47

45

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer

Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
46

Id.

47

Farber, supra note 37, at 562.
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because “[c]ommercial speech . . . [more] closely resembles
a private good [than does political speech].

Most of the

benefit of product advertising is captured by the producer
itself in the form of increased sales.

Consequently, we

would not expect severe underproduction of commercial
speech.”48
It is conceivable that if accepted as a rationale for
reduced protection of commercial speech, the argument
grounded in motivational heartiness would, in fact, justify
the drawing of a distinction between direct commercial
promotion of sale, on the one hand, and a Consumer Reports
discussion of products, on the other.

As Professor Farber

asserts, “[p]roduct information distributed by a third
party produces benefits that are captured by persons other
than the speaker.

The speaker, therefore, has an

inadequate motivation to produce this information.”49

One

response to Farber’s point is that Consumer Reports does
have an economic incentive to produce and distribute its
information, for the simple reason that it is able to sell
its magazines because of that information.

It is arguable,

perhaps, that unlike the manufacturer or dealer, Consumer

48

Id. at 565 (footnote omitted).

49

Id. at 566.
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Reports does not benefit economically — at least directly —
by listener acceptance of, and action upon, its expression,
although if listeners or readers do not accept what
Consumer Reports says, presumably they will not buy its
publication and the publishers will lose money.

The

problems with this “motivational heartiness” rationale,
however, are far more significant than this single concern.
In different ways, this rationale for refusing to
protect speech manages to be simultaneously over- and
underinclusive.

It is overinclusive, in that it ignores

vitally important differences among different forms of
expressive regulation.

When the governmental regulation is

partial, it is at least conceivable that the motivational
heartiness rationale is relevant.

Thus, it could be argued

(albeit incorrectly I believe) that where government
prohibits only false commercial speech — which itself is
presumed to fall outside the First Amendment’s protective
scope — the spillover chilling effect on protected truthful
commercial speech is diluted by the competing motivation of
speaker self-interest.

The speaker’s desire to communicate

truthful information would continue to exist despite the
possible fear that what it deems truthful will subsequently
be punished as false.

But when the governmental regulation

of expression is total, meaning that it has simply shut
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down all forms of that type of communication, the
motivational heartiness rationale does not make the
slightest bit of sense.

Where government has suppressed

all of a particular form of expression, what possible
difference does it make that the would-be speaker’s
motivation to speak remains strong due to self-interest?
Under such circumstances, no matter how motivated the
speaker may be, he is denied the right or opportunity to
speak.

Here, the motivational heartiness rationale amounts

to a complete non-sequitur.

The essence of that argument

in this context would necessarily be that it does not
matter that the speaker has been completely prohibited from
conveying truthful information, because he continues to
have the motivation to disseminate truthful information.
But the conclusion in no way logically flows from the
premise.

To the contrary: to state the proposition is to

underscore its incoherence.

Nor is it the case that the

overwhelming number of commercial speech regulations are
aimed only at false or misleading commercial information.50

50

Indeed, one can see this simply by a casual examination

of the Supreme Court’s commercial speech decisions.

In

virtually none of them was the primary or exclusive subject
of regulation false or misleading commercial speech.
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See,

Thus, at the very least those reflexively relying on the
motivational heartiness rationale as a justification for
reducing commercial speech protection need to be far more
selective as to the nature of the expressive regulation
being justified.
It actually matters little how selective supporters of
this rationale are in choosing among types of expressive
regulation, however, because the rationale’s logic is
fatally underinclusive in the scope of speakers penalized
by its reach.

It is true, as Professor Farber and others

have suggested, that commercial advertisers have an
enormous motivation, grounded in stark economic selfinterest, to communicate with and persuade potential
purchasers.51

But it is surely not difficult to think of

numerous other groups of speakers who fit the same
description.

Candidates for political office have an

enormous motivation, grounded in self-interest, both to
e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 368
(2002) (prohibition on advertising of compound drugs);
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001)
(restrictions on tobacco advertising); Greater New Orleans
Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 185 (1999)
(restrictions on advertising of gambling).
51

Farber, supra note 37, at 565.
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communicate and to persuade.

Perhaps one could respond

that while this is possible, it is also conceivable that
the candidate could be motivated by more public-oriented
goals.

Yet, no one can know this ex ante, in the

particular case.

We nevertheless extend full protection to

all candidate speech.

Moreover, one can also hypothesize

that there are businesses motivated simultaneously by goals
of personal economic gain and public interest.

In any

event, one can hypothesize numerous categories of speakers
who are obviously and unambiguously motivated by personal
gain, yet whose speech unquestionably receives full First
Amendment protection: welfare mothers picketing for
increased benefits, anti-taxation groups, labor unions, and
political lobbying groups are illustrative.
c. The Speech-Action Dichotomy
Perhaps the Court’s focus on the proposal of a
commercial transaction as the defining element of less
protected commercial speech can be grounded in the wellestablished speech-action dichotomy.

Both textually and

theoretically, the First Amendment protects speech, not
actions.

To the extent expression promoting commercial

transactions is “linked inextricably” to the commercial
transactions themselves, arguably the speech collapses into
the non-expressive commercial transaction.
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As a result,

its status as protected speech is at least diluted, if not
completely revoked.
At most, this reasoning could have relevance to
promotion at the point of sale.

It is only at the point of

sale that commercial advocacy is, even arguably, so
temporarily linked to the acts of purchase and sale that it
can realistically be deemed an element of these acts.
Moreover, to suggest that speech that advocates action is
automatically rendered the equivalent of action would defy
both conceptual reality and at least seventy years of the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.52

The Court

has long held that many forms of advocacy of conduct
receive full First Amendment protection, even though the
advocated conduct is itself unlawful.53

For that reason,

speech that advocates action is no less classifiable as
“speech” for purposes of First Amendment protection.
Indeed, speech advocating some alteration in listener

52

See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52

(1919)

(explaining that unlawful advocacy can be

suppressed only when it gives rise to a clear and present
danger of illegal harm).
53

See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49

(1969) (per curiam).
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behavior is in many ways at the core of the constitutional
protection, which recognizes the inherent intersection
between expression and political choice.

Thus, the speech-

action dichotomy fails to justify a categorical distinction
between commercial and noncommercial expression.
d. The Corporate Nature of the Speaker
One could conceivably reject protection for commercial
speech due to the nature of the speaker.

The speaker

proposing a commercial transaction is invariably a profitmaking corporation, an artificial legal creation of the
state whose sole reason for existence is profit
maximization.

Professor Baker has argued that because free

speech necessarily implicates the exercise of free will,
the expression of corporations — which is nothing more than
the reflexive, robotic attempt to increase profits — cannot
qualify for protection.54

For this reason, Professor Baker

would deny protection not only to commercial speech, but
also to purely political speech uttered by corporations.55
I have long believed that Professor Baker’s reasoning
is fatally flawed, because he refuses to acknowledge the
relevance of the free speech benefits that may flow to the

54

Baker, supra note 6, at 652.

55

Id.
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listener or reader from reading or hearing speech emanating
from corporations, either commercial or political.56

If one

assumes that the values of free speech can be fostered by
the receipt, as well as by the communication, of
expression,57 then it should logically make no difference
whether the speaker itself deserves the benefits of the
constitutional protection.

I have further argued that

Baker’s approach views the corporation in too truncated a
fashion, because it ignores the reason that free willed
individuals choose to form a corporation in the first
place.

The modern corporation developed most completely

during the time of Andrew Jackson’s administration, as a
means by which the common person could compete with the
propertied upper classes of the northeast.

Thus, resort to

the corporate form can be viewed as a type of “catalytic
self-realization” that facilitates individuals’ efforts to

56

See Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good

for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free
Expression, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 235, 235-36 (1997).
57

The theory that free speech values should be viewed from

a listener’s perspective is associated primarily with the
writing of Alexander Meiklejohn.

See, e.g., Meiklejohn,

supra note 38, at 60.
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realize both their goals and their potential.58

But even if

one were to suspend disbelief and accept Baker’s dubious
logic, his argument remains grossly underinclusive as a
justification for a surgical excision of commercial speech
from the First Amendment’s protective scope.

The

institutional media — from the New York Times to the
National Enquirer — are as much profit-making corporations
as is any commercial advertiser.

Every publishing decision

they make is therefore presumably as motivated by profit
maximization as are those of non-media corporations.
There appear to exist several possible responses to my
underinclusiveness argument.

First, Professor Baker has

asserted a distinction grounded in the First Amendment’s
separate constitutional protection for freedom of the
press.59

Because the corporate media are appropriately

classified as “press,” he argues, they are to be treated
differently, for protective purposes, from non-media
speakers.60

Thus, the exclusion of robotic profit

58

Redish & Wasserman, supra note 56, at 237.

59

See U.S. Const. amend. I.

60

See C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech

225-49 (1989).
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maximizers from the First Amendment is apparently to be
confined to “speakers,” rather than to “press.”
There is much that is troubling in Baker’s reasoning.
First, historical support for Baker’s grounding of his
asserted distinction in framers’ intent is weak for two
reasons.

Initially, one can appropriately question the

interpretive legitimacy of any form of inquiry into
original intent,61 and it is only if one accepts the
validity of original intent as a form of constitutional
interpretation that Baker’s argument could even conceivably
have relevance.

More importantly, his argument fails

because it amounts to an anachronism: at the time of the
framing, there existed no corporate, profit making
institutional press in the sense that it exists today.62

61

It

Martin H. Redish, Good Behavior, Judicial Independence,

and the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 116 Yale
L.J. 139, 146-47 (2006); see also Robert W. Bennett,
Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 445,
449 (1984).
62

According to Professor Hovenkamp:
The two greatest classical legal institutions in
the

United

corporation

States
and

the

—

the

modern

constitutional
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business

doctrine

of

therefore makes no sense to impute to the framers the
intent to exclude corporate speakers, but not the corporate
press from the scope of the First Amendment.

Secondly, it

would have been all but impossible at the time — and,
indeed, today — to distinguish the institutional press from
the “non-institutional” press, if one were even able to
persuasively hypothesize such a distinction on a conceptual
level in the first place.

Third, it is difficult to

understand why, purely as a normative matter, one would
choose to give greater protection to the institutional
corporate press than to other more random and less profitmotivated written forms of expression.

Inferring such a

distinction from the First Amendment would effectively

substantive due process — are both distinctively
Jacksonian

products.

corporation

had

its

The
origin

modern
in

the

business
general

corporation acts, one of the most important legal
accomplishments of a regime bent on democratizing
and deregulating American business.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937 2
(1991).

Thus, the modern business corporation is a product

of the Jacksonian period, long after the framing of the
Constitution.
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transform that provision into one big anti-competitive
antitrust violation — hardly a legitimate goal of the
constitutional protection of expression.
Perhaps one could respond that it is necessary to
provide the institutional press with greater protection,
simply to assure the press’s performance of its vital
“checking function,” by which it exposes — and thereby
limits — governmental excess and abuse.63

But while

checking governmental abuse is surely a worthy aim of the
First Amendment, it would make no sense to confine
performance of that function to some “in group” of
established, institutional corporate media.

One need point

only to the New York Times’ pathetic performance as a check
on the administration’s now-disproven charges of weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq to see that the institutional
press is often far more willing to jump into bed with
government than it is to check it.64

63

It makes sense,

See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the

First Amendment, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 449, 480 (1985).
64

See, e.g., Judith Miller, Defectors Bolster U.S. Case

Against Iraq, Officials Say, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 2003, at
A11; Judith Miller, Disarming Saddam Hussein: Teams of
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therefore, to view the scope of the press protection
broadly, rather than narrowly.
Most devastating to Baker’s effort to rationalize his
corporate press/non-press distinction is the simple fact
that it is, at its foundation, wholly illogical.

If the

robotic goal of profit maximization is somehow assumed to
justify exclusion from the First Amendment’s scope when
non-institutional press is involved — a conclusion that, it
should be recalled, I wholly reject — then presumably it is
the absence of speaker free will that justifies such
exclusion.

If the institutional press is made up of profit

maximizing corporations, then they, too, must be motivated
solely by robotic profit maximization — the very fact
relied upon to justify exclusion of corporate speakers in
the first place!

Baker, then, needs to make up his mind:

Does the existence of a goal of robotic profit maximization
logically lead to speaker exclusion from the First
Amendment’s scope, or does it not?

If it does, then he

logically must also exclude the corporate press.

If it

does not, then he cannot automatically exclude expression
of the non-press corporation.

Reliance on the existence of

Experts to Hunt Iraq Arms, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2003, at
A1.
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a separate press clause, then, provides him no outlet.

If

the existence of a rigid goal of profit maximization is
consistent with the notion of constitutional protection for
communication in the press context, it logically follows
that the values of the First Amendment can co-exist with
such profit maximizing motivation.

But if that is true,

then one cannot rationally exclude constitutional
protection for corporate speech solely on the grounds that
it is robotically profit-maximizing.
Yet one could possibly point to other asserted
distinctions between commercial advertisers and the
institutional press besides a specious, straw-grabbing
reliance on an anachronistic and illogical press/non-press
distinction.

It could also be argued, for example, that

one does not necessarily know what positions will be taken
in the institutional press on issues of public importance.
In contrast, one knows for certain, ex ante, that a
commercial advertiser will promote purchase.

One could

perhaps reason that it is this certainty that distinguishes
commercial speech from the expression of the corporate
press.

But this argument amounts to nothing more than

condemnation — and exclusion — of a speaker because she is
an advocate.

We know, ex ante, that a lawyer arguing on

behalf of a client will take a position that, in one way or
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another, supports that client’s interests, not necessarily
because the lawyer agrees normatively with that position,
but because that is the lawyer’s role within the adversary
system.65

Surely, it does not logically follow that what

the lawyer says is inherently unpersuasive or suspect.

The

same is true for countless non-commercial advocates, whose
views and positions are quite obviously predetermined by
self-interest.66

Again, neither Baker nor virtually any

other critic of commercial speech protection chooses for
that reason to exclude the expression of those speakers
from the First Amendment’s protection.
One might also point to the public interest that
exists in the substance of what the institutional media
report on, which is to be contrasted to the far narrower
concerns of the commercial advertiser.

But this argument,

too, is fatally underinclusive, as long as one assumes that
Consumer Reports, which deals with no issue beyond those of

65

Martin H. Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic

Theory, and the Constitutional Role of Self-Interest: The
Tobacco Wars, 1953-1971, 51 Depaul L. Rev. 359, 362-63
(2001) [hereinafter Redish, Adversary System].
66

See discussion supra note 21.
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the merits of commercial products and services, is to
receive full constitutional protection.
Finally, it could be argued that the right being
asserted is not that of the corporate press, but rather of
the reporter or writer who works for the corporation.

But

what if, as common sense tells us is likely often the case,
the reporter writes what the corporation wants her to
write?

67

At the very least, we can be reasonably assured

that in most cases, the reporter writes nothing that the
corporation does not wish to be printed.

In any event, no

one has even suggested that the press’s First Amendment
right in any way turns on the relationship between writer
and corporate publisher in an individual case.

67

And it

See Ronnie Dugger, The Corporate Domination of

Journalism, in The Business of Journalism 27, 27, 34-35
(William Serrin ed., 2000)(“Corporate censorship now shapes
the whole mainstream media process . . . . The reporter,
for the dissemination of whose honest work the press is
supposed to be free, is subordinated now to the nature of
the corporation itself and to the mass-audience
requirements, ideological restraints, profit-making
imperatives . . . of those same advertising and
entertainment corporations.”).
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cannot be forgotten that the corporate publisher got to
choose its reporters in the first place.

Thus, as long as

it is the corporate publisher, rather than the writer
himself, that is the subject of the infringement, this
factor cannot reasonably distinguish the profit motivation
of the corporate institutional press from that of the
commercial advertiser.
Finally, I suppose that the ultimate refuge of one who
has no other argument to make is to fall back on mindless
adherence to tradition.

The institutional press receives

full protection, despite its inexorable drive to maximize
profits, for no reason other than in American tradition it
is has been deemed to receive it, while commercial speech
has not.

But this form of “proof by adverse possession”

makes little sense.

Also part of our nation’s “tradition,”

tragically, were slavery, Jim Crow laws, the near genocide
of the Native American population, and the (shockingly
recent) confinement of American citizens for no reason
other than their national origin during World War II.
Surely, then, not every part of our tradition is to be
deemed preserved by constitutional value.

If one can

defend the unprincipled distinction between First Amendment
protection for the corporate press on the one hand and the
commercial advertiser on the other solely on grounds of
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tradition, one has, for all practical purposes, conceded
the argument.
e. Speaker Self-Interest
In some ways, the argument grounded in speaker selfinterest has already been alluded to as part of the
discussion of the possible distinctions between commercial
advertising and the corporate media.68

In a broader sense,

however, the argument potentially stands on a separate
footing as an independent basis for excluding commercial
speech from the First Amendment’s protective reach.

No

commercial advertiser, it may be safely presumed, is likely
to highlight the flaws or deficiencies in its product or
the comparative advantages of a competitor’s product.

In

this way, it might be argued that commercial speech is
inherently misleading because of its strategic and
selective incompleteness.69

68

See discussion supra Part II.C.1.d.

69

This argument, it should be noted, is distinct from an

argument that posits that while commercial speech is
deserving of First Amendment protection in the abstract,
false and misleading commercial speech is not deserving of
such protection.

This argument, in contrast, assumes the
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This argument is, of course, transparently
underinclusive in its reach.

Surely, strategic and

selective advocacy is by no means confined to commercial
advertising.

To the contrary, casual experience and common

sense tell us that there is preciously little fully
protected expression that could properly be labeled
“objective.”

Countless speakers, whether in the political,

academic, or social worlds, have an underlying agenda when
they speak.

This invariably leads them to selectively omit

damaging information from the content of their argument.
This is as true of political interest groups as it is of
political candidates.

For example, the National Rifle

Association is no more likely to promote in its literature
the number of people killed annually in gun accidents than
gun control advocates are likely to highlight the number of
crimes prevented due to gun ownership.

Yet, somehow, this

fact never leads the very same scholars who criticize
protection of commercial speech to argue for reduced
protection for the speech of interest groups or political
candidates.

Instead, we accept as a given that individuals

and associations have a full constitutional right to

inherently misleading nature of commercial speech because
of its inherent advocacy.
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promote their goals — often involving personal economic
gain70 — through the use of expression as a means of
persuading listeners, readers and viewers to accept their
positions.

Yet, this is, of course, exactly what

commercial advertisers are doing.71
f. Regulatory Motivation
The final conceivably principled rationale for the
reduction in or exclusion of commercial speech from the
First Amendment is what I label “regulatory motivation.”
Simply put, the argument is that when political speech is
regulated, there exists an appropriate degree of mistrust
of and skepticism about the motivation of the regulator.
Such skepticism flows from the inherent incentive of those
in power to suppress the expression of their out-of-power
rivals.

This fact gives rise to the need for a reviewing

70

See discussion supra Part II.C.1.b.

71

As previously noted, acceptance of the appropriateness of

strategic incompleteness in expression provides the
foundation for our commitment to the adversary system.
discussion supra Parts II.C.1.d-e.

See

See generally Redish,

Adversary System, supra note 65 (discussing the concept of
adversary theory in the context of free speech and due
process).
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court to intervene more aggressively to counter the
incentive to over-regulate and to protect free speech
interests.72
This reasoning resonates with the inherent skepticism
that led the framers to adopt systems of separation of
powers, federalism, and checks and balances when they
promulgated the Constitution.73

Perhaps “if angels were to

govern,” the authors of the Federalist Papers reasoned,

72

Puzzlingly, this inherent incentive to suppress the

competition appears to have been largely ignored by certain
members of the Supreme Court in the area of campaign
finance regulation.

Justice Breyer, for example, has urged

greater-than-normal deference to legislative choices in
campaign finance regulation, due to the supposed
“expertise” of a governing legislative body.

See Randall

v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2492 (2006); McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003).

He does so,

despite the obvious fact that sitting legislators have an
inherent interest in confining the ability of opponents to
equalize the advantages traditionally associated with
incumbency.
73

See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2; id. art. III, § 2; id. art.

V.
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there would be no need for such protections.74

Sadly, the

eminent drafters of those documents recognized that those
who do govern are likely to be far from angelic.75
Whether this reasoning justifies reduced or excluded
protection for commercial speech, however, is a very
different matter, for at least two reasons.

First, the

insights of public choice literature tell us that the
legislative regulatory process is fraught with dangers of
rent-seeking or improper influence by special interests and
private parties.76

74

There is no reason to believe that these

See The Federalist No. 51, at 118 (James Madison) (J. &

A. McLean ed., 1788).
75

See id.

See generally Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth

Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic
Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 Duke L.J. 449
(1991) (discussing the doctrine of separation of powers and
the various models used to resolve separation of powers
disputes).
76

See generally Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican

Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539 (1988)

(advocating that a

republican approach to the First Amendment offers reasons
to reform many areas of modern law); Steven Kelman, “Public
Choice” and Public Spirit, 87 Pub. Int. 80 (1987) (arguing
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dangers are any less when the subject of regulation is
commercial, rather than political, behavior.

Indeed, those

with financial resources sufficient to influence political
decision making are often commercial operators who are
likely to be disposed towards suppression of their
competition.

Suppression of the speech of their

competitors is often likely to be as effective, and far
more subtle, than direct regulation of competitors’
commercial behavior.

To point to one of many conceivable

examples, the drug industry could conceivably seek to
influence the legislative process for the purpose of
suppressing advertising of generic, compound, or
homeopathic competitors.

There is, then, no ex ante basis

on which to assume the good faith or neutrality of
legislative regulators in the regulation of commercial
activity.
The same skepticism might also affect administrative
regulation.

Scholars have often pointed to the danger of

“captured agencies,” in which regulators travel back and

that the practice of public choice itself is essentially
immoral); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public
Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1985) (suggesting courts use
republican ideals to assess political processes).
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forth between governmental agencies and the industries they
regulate.77

This danger, under certain circumstances, could

negatively affect competitors of those regulated.

The

problem for a reviewing court, of course, is that it is
both difficult and unseemly to attempt to ferret out such
pathological motivation in a particular case.

It is,

therefore, appropriate to generically presume the danger of
regulatory abuse when commercial speech is the subject of
regulation, much as we do when political speech is the
subject of regulation.
Moreover, exclusive focus on the danger of
pathological regulatory motive unduly truncates both First
Amendment interests and the threat posed to them by
regulation, particularly of the administrative variety.

As

I have argued in another context, regulatory bodies exist
for the very purpose of regulating.78

77

It is all but

See, e.g., Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The

Second Republic of the United States 77-78 (2d ed. 1979).
78

See Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior

Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 Va. L.
Rev. 53, 76 (1984) (“Nonjudicial administrative regulators
of expression exist for the sole purpose of regulating;
that is their raison d’etre.”); see also Thomas I. Emerson,
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inconceivable, then, that they can be presumed to provide
protection for free speech interests which stand as
potential obstacles to regulation with the appropriate
level of intensity.

It is not uncommon for regulators to

focus their concern on a paternalistic desire to protect
individuals by selectively suppressing promotion of sale of
legal products.79

This is so, even if we assume no ulterior

or pathological regulatory motivation.

It is simply a

matter of the cognitive dissonance that inheres in holding
the position in the first place.

This danger exists just

as much when the subject of regulation is commercial speech
as when it is non-commercial speech.
Finally, reliance on a focus on potential pathological
regulatory motivation as a justification for drawing a
protective distinction between commercial and noncommercial expression is fatally underinclusive for yet

The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Contemp. Probs.
648, 659 (1955) (“The function of the censor is to censor.
He has a professional interest in finding things to
suppress.”).
79

See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491

(1995) (finding a law that prohibits beer labels from
displaying alcohol content violates the First Amendment).
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another reason.

Even were one to assume, for purposes of

argument, that the danger of regulatory pathology exists
for political speech regulation but not for commercial
speech regulation, it would remain unclear why Consumer
Reports would receive full First Amendment protection.
Presumably, there is at least as small a danger of
regulatory pathology when objective comments on commercial
products and services are made as when commercial advocacy
is regulated.

Thus, as is the case for all of the

conceivable “rationalist” defenses of reduced protection
for commercial speech, the regulatory motivation argument
is obviously — and fatally — underinclusive.80

80

It was suggested at the oral symposium of the Loyola of

Los Angeles Law Review that even if I were correct in my
assertion that none of these six posited justifications
provides rational support for reduced protection for
commercial speech, the six of them combined may do so.
Remarks at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium:
Commercial Speech: Past, Present, and Future (Feb. 24,
2007).

I have a great deal of trouble understanding this

argument; adding six losing lottery tickets together does
not equal one winning lottery ticket.

I have demonstrated

that each, on its own terms, is false, illogical,
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2. “Intuitionist” Grounds
First Amendment scholarship is often characterized by
what could best be described as an “anti-rationalist”
school of thought.81

Though some scholars somehow manage to

fit themselves into both rationalist and anti-rationalist
camps,82 for the most part, acceptance of this anti-

inconsistent, or otherwise invalid.

It is therefore

difficult to see how each could be transformed into a
necessary-but-insufficient condition for the proposition
that commercial speech is undeserving of protection.
81

See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,

Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. Rev.
1615, 1639-56 (1987).
82

Professor Farber’s scholarship, for example, has included

both rationalist and anti-rationalist arguments for reduced
protection of commercial speech.

As for rationalist

arguments, see Farber, supra note 37, at 562-68, wherein he
asserts a public choice version of what I have labeled a
motivational heartiness argument.
Part II.C.1.b.

See discussion supra

On the other hand, Professor Farber’s work

on commercial speech (co-authored with Professor Frickey)
is characterized by reliance on a quasi-intuitionist form
of “practical reason” and a rejection of heavily
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rationalism allows its advocate to reach decisions about
the scope of First Amendment protection without risking a
headache due to over-thinking.

Instead of worrying about

how to deal with annoying logical inconsistencies in their
conclusions, they choose to defend their decisions on
grounds that are fundamentally right-brained and,
therefore, presumably immune to rationalist attack.

These

intuitionist scholars are, in other words, focused
exclusively on the intuitive appeal of the result of the
extension or non-extension of First Amendment protection to
a particular hypothetical situation.
Thus, Professors Farber and Frickey imply the
preposterousness of suggesting a constitutional equivalence
between political speech and an advertisement for soap,
without enlightening us as to why, exactly, no equivalence
can be drawn.83

Professors Jackson and Jeffries assert —

without so much as the slightest grounding in rational
thought — that whatever the First Amendment protects, it

rationalist arguments in support of commercial speech
protection.

See Farber & Frickey, supra note 81, at 1639-

56.
83

See Farber & Frickey, supra note 81, at 1622.
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surely fails to protect “a seller hawking his wares.”84
Phrased in such a way, I suppose it does — superficially,
at least — seem intuitively nonsensical to provide full
constitutional protection to such fluff as that.

But when

one attempts to deconstruct their reasoning, one finds
little more than hyperbolic pejorative in support of their
sweeping and summary exclusion of commercial speech from
the First Amendment’s scope.
Professor Emerson asserted many years ago that
commercial speech concerns the field of property rights,
rather than those centered on expression.85

But like Farber

and Frickey and Jackson and Jeffries, Emerson fails to make
even the slightest effort to explain why this is so, or,
for that matter, why the two are somehow assumed to be
mutually exclusive in the first place, even if he is
correct in his assertion that commercial speech implicates
the system of property rights.

But all of these free

speech commentators are freed from so burdensome a task as
engaging in careful, reasoned, and logically consistent

84

Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial

Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65
Va. L. Rev. 1, 2-6 (1979).
85

Emerson, supra note 17, at 414-17, 447.
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explication of their conclusions.

Each of them, in one way

or another, is (if only implicitly) employing a form of
First Amendment intuitionism86 — which, I suppose, is simply
another word for “conclusory.”
I truly envy those scholars who feel sufficiently
comfortable with their total abandonment of the obligations
of reason and logical consistency so as to develop official
labels for their refusal to recognize and assume the task
of reasoned analysis that has traditionally been deemed
inherent in the scholarly endeavor.
concede, is brilliant.

How, after all, can one respond to

a reliance on “intuitionism”?
it wrong?

The strategy, I fully

How can one possibly prove

Measured by an intuitionist perspective, a

conclusion’s truth is established automatically by its
assertion.

This is so, because the assertion

unquestionably represents the speaker’s intuition as a
definitional matter.

A decision based on constitutional

intuition, then, can never be “wrong.”

86

Professor Shiffrin has explicitly employed the term

“intuitionism” to describe his approach to First Amendment
interpretation.

See Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment

and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the
First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1212, 1254 (1984).
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Whether practical reason demands more intellectual
rigor than intuitionism appears to be the subject of
debate.

Farber and Frickey, for example, have suggested

that it does.

Yet, their own suggested definition of

practical reason certainly fails to instill confidence in
their ability to translate the phrase’s seemingly vague
terms into something capable of providing meaningful
guidance as to what is and is not appropriate.

Farber and

Frickey suggest “an alternative view of the first
amendment’s normative status.

Rather than thinking of free

speech as one level in a hierarchy of values, it may be
better to think of it as part of a web of mutually
reinforcing values.”87

The problem they see with more

conceptually foundational, logically applied theories is
that these approaches often lead inexorably to “highly
dubious applications, which the theorist presents as
logically inescapable inferences from his premise.”88

They

conclude that “[w]hen a concrete application of grand
theory cannot be squared with our complex, situationally

87

Farber & Frickey, supra note 81, at 1640.

88

Id. at 1641.
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sensitive web of beliefs, it is the former that is likely
to give way.”89
If all Farber and Frickey are saying is that pragmatic
considerations must at some point be taken into account in
shaping First Amendment jurisprudence, I certainly do not
disagree.

But pragmatic considerations, too, can and

should be developed first on a generalized basis as part
and parcel of, or at least a gloss on, the general theory,
and then applied to specific fact situations as a
transparent potential qualifier or limitation on the
remaining part of the theory.

Thus, my self-realization

theory is expressly restrained by recognition of the need
to take into account cases in which there exists a
compelling need to prevent harm, usually physical harm.
But surely inclusion of this limited pragmatic gloss —
itself appropriately disciplined by its own sets of
internally principled restrictions90 — is a far cry from the

89

Id.

90

See generally Martin H. Redish, Unlawful Advocacy and

Free Speech Theory: Rethinking the Lessons of the McCarthy
Era, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 9 (2004) (exploring contexts in
which danger of harm should be found to restrict speech
rights).
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vague and malleable reference to a “complex, situationally
sensitive web of beliefs” to which they cryptically refer.91
Farber and Frickey assert that all forms of modern
practical reason:
[S]hare some fundamental characteristics. Among
them are a concern for history and context; a
desire to avoid abstracting away the human
component
in
judicial
decisionmaking;
an
appreciation of the complexity of life; some
faith in dialogue and deliberation; a tolerance
for ambiguity, accommodation, and tentativeness,
but a skepticism of rigid dichotomies; and an
overall humility.92
Practical reason, they readily concede:
[I]s unruly.
It specifies no certain starting
point, follows no predestined path, may frolic as
well as detour, and cannot rise above the
abilities
of
its
users.
Indeed,
the
indeterminacy
of
practical
reasoning
might
suggest that it cannot achieve the status of a
theory at all.
Like ‘prudence’ and ‘wisdom’ in
everyday affairs, legal practical reasoning is
explained better by example than by abstract
methodological prescriptions . . . . The absence
of a formula for practical reasoning is inherent
in the enterprise . . . .93
What seems to be missing from this discussion is any
effort to explain how one actually goes about attempting to
resolve a specific case on the basis of practical reason.
In contrast to principled decision making, practical reason
91

Farber & Frickey, supra note 81, at 1641.

92

Id. at 1646.

93

Id. at 1647-48.
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appears to rely on a far cruder resort to a pre-existing
set of widely shared prejudices and normative social
instincts, untied to any effort to resolve individual cases
by reliance on broader and deeper forms of constitutional
value development, determined before examination of the
specific situational context.

Strongest evidence of this

ominous absence of grounding in some consistently applied
set of non-contextual values is Farber and Frickey’s total
failure to explain why “selling soap” is less deserving of
First Amendment protection than other, more traditionally
protected types of expression.94

Yet they are more than

willing to criticize my concededly counterintuitive
suggestion (to many, at least) that no principled basis,
grounded in accepted and transparent principles of First
Amendment theory, can justify a gradation of protection
between the two subjects of expression.95

Instead of

resorting to so burdensome and unpleasant a theoretical and
logical inquiry, Farber and Frickey appear to rely on a
kind of intuitive situational judgment, largely
inexplicable beyond the conclusory expression of a deepseated feeling that somehow the two situations must be

94

See id. at 1622.

95

See id. at 1622-24.
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treated differently.

This intuitive judgment, apparently,

is to be derived from the observer’s preexisting personal
“web of values” and perceptions.96
How much so-called practical reason extends beyond
inherently anti-rationalist and logically inexplicable
First Amendment intuitionism, like almost everything else
about these frustratingly cryptic modes of First Amendment
analysis, remains unclear.

Although Professor Farber

suggests that intuitionism, like practical reason, is part
of “a movement away from grand theory,”97 he ultimately
rejects the notion that practical reason is identical to
intuitionism.98

But while Professor Farber extends a great

96

Note that in a subsequent article, Farber

Id. at 1641.

does resort to a more rationalist form of argument to
justify reduced protection for commercial speech.
generally Farber, supra note 37.

See

However, I have already

demonstrated the flaws in his argument.

See discussion

supra Part II.C.1.b.
97

Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason:

Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 Vand. L. Rev.
533, 538 (1992).
98

See id. at 542 (“Whatever practical reason may be, it is

neither deduction nor intuition.”).
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deal of effort to tell us what practical reason is not,99 he
spends precious little time telling us what it is.

Indeed,

he attempts to define the concept primarily in terms of
what it rejects.

Practical reason means, he asserts, “a

rejection of the view that rules and precedents in and of
themselves dictate outcomes.”100

He adds that:

At the level of legal theory, practical reason
means a rejection of foundationalism, the view
that normative conclusions can be deduced from a
single unifying value or principle. At the level
of judicial practice, practical reason rejects
legal formalism, the view that the proper
decision in a case can be deduced from a preexisting set of rules.101
The rejected techniques, Professor Farber explains, “rely
heavily on deductive logic (i.e., the syllogism) as the
primary method of analysis.”102
While Professor Farber candidly concedes that
practical reason “is easier to invoke than to define,”103

99

Professor Farber tells us, for example, that “practical

reason does not mean — as is sometimes mistakenly thought —
an embrace of ad hoc decisionmaking.”
100

Id. at 539.

101

Id.

102

Id.

Id. at 538-39.
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perhaps his description of what the concept is not helps us
to see that if practical reason is not identical to
intuitionism, it is close enough to be considered a kissing
cousin.

Both seem to share a heavily anti-rationalist

view, chafing at the restraints that syllogistic reasoning
imposes on implementation of desired decision making. In
this sense, the two can be treated fungibly for present
purposes.

Both modes of decision making free a reviewing

court from the bonds of reason, consistency, and
predictability that inherently characterize principled
decision-making.
With what, exactly, do advocates of either approach
fill the intellectual vacuum created by their rejection of
the demands of principle and reason?

One point seems

clear: the anti-rationalism that they share suggests that
under both approaches, decisions are made on the basis of
some sort of unexplained — and, quite probably,
inexplicable — value choices, external to the
constitutional provision being interpreted.

For if they

did, in fact, derive from an analysis of the value or

103

Id.

See also id. at 541 (“[A]dherents to practical

reason have not fully explained what cognitive processes in
addition to deductive logic they view as legitimate.”).
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values gleaned from the provision’s text or structure, they
presumably could be explained transparently and supported
rationally.

From where are these value choices, external

to the interpreted constitutional provision, to be derived?
One possibility is from the wholly subjective normative
value structure of the particular judicial decision
maker.104

At the very least, it would be difficult to

prevent such a result, even if it were not desired, were
these non-rationalist decision-making models to be
employed.

The intellectual fog that flows from rejection

of all demand of logic or principle would inevitably
provide easy cover for implementation of the judge’s
personal moral or political value structure through the
case-by-case process of constitutional interpretation.

A

second alternative, at least in theory, would be to fill
the decision-making vacuum with a judicial implementation
of what the court determines to be public sensibilities on
the specific issue before the court.105
Neither of these alternatives provides a satisfactory
solution. Indeed, both should frighten the stuffing out of
any thoughtful observer of the constitutional decision-

104

See, e.g., Post, supra note 7, at 34-41.

105

See, e.g., id. at 20.
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making process.

An approach that condones as a guidepost

for judicial application of the First Amendment right of
free expression a judge’s implementation of her own
personal political, social, or moral value structure,
disguised under some vapid heading such as “intuitionism”
or “practical reason,” should be viewed as the worst form
of judicial irresponsibility.

Indeed, scholars of the

political left who advocate use of practical reason or
intuitionism in First Amendment interpretation should be
very careful what they wish for.

It is unlikely that the

“intuition” of many federal and state judges who sit today
would match those of left leaning academics.

Yet if the

judge steadfastly maintains that her “intuition” is that
pro-choice demonstrators must be denied a First Amendment
right to express their views because they advocate baby
killing, the most an academic critic can respond is that
his intuition differs from that of the judge.

Reliance on

intuitionism or practical reason, then, will let
constitutional protection turn on the vagaries of
subjective judicial preferences, and it will usually be
impossible to determine what those preferences are, ex
ante.
Even less appealing is the use of practical reason as
a means of implementing some judicially perceived notion of
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widespread public sensibilities.

Initially, it is

difficult to imagine a branch of government less well
suited to determine public sensibilities on a particular
issue than the unaccountable, unrepresentative federal
judiciary.106

If one were to proceed on the assumption that

assessment of public sensibilities should be deemed
constitutionally significant, it would make far more sense
to leave those choices to the representative and
accountable branches of government.

Moreover, the federal

judiciary has no access to expensive and carefully
performed empirical studies that can provide it with
accurate information about public preferences.

Finally,

and most importantly, to let First Amendment protection
turn on some notion of public sensibilities on a subject
effectively turns that countermajoritarian constitutional
protection on its head.

The idea of the First Amendment,

at the very least, is to protect the right to express
unpopular ideas, which are protected by the insulated

106

See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (providing federal judges

with life tenure and protections of their salary during
good behavior); see also U.S. Const. art. II, § 2
(providing the President with authority to nominate federal
judges, subject to confirmation by the Senate).
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judiciary from suppression by the majority.107

If the reach

of the First Amendment is somehow to be coordinated with
widespread public sensibilities on the subject of or views
expressed in the challenged speech, then the First
Amendment will have been effectively rendered a nullity.
It should be emphasized that in rejecting both
intuitionism and practical reason as the guidepost for
First Amendment interpretation, I do not mean to put in
their stead some sort of abstract Langdellian formalism.
As I have acknowledged in past writing,108 cases will
inevitably arise in which the outcome cannot be predicted
simply on the basis of some formulaic statement of the law.
The key, however, is that in such cases the issue will
concern the nature of the harm to which the regulated
speech gives rise and the extent to which, under the

107

See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes,

J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s imposition of
its views by means of censoring expression of minority
views).
108

See Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First

Amendment Analysis, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 113, 119-20 (1981)
(recognizing a limited role in First Amendment analysis for
case-by-case balancing process).
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circumstances of the particular case, that harm can
appropriately be thought to give rise to a compelling
governmental interest justifying regulation of expression.
But those who reject First Amendment protection for
commercial speech cannot reasonably argue that commercial
speech — at least truthful commercial speech — necessarily
causes more harm than do all forms of fully protected
political speech, such as advocacy of violent overthrow.109
They are, instead, making some form of judgment about the
nature or value of the expression itself.
The major distinction between practical reason and the
use of a harm standard as a qualifier of the implications
of rational analysis is that the latter, unlike the former,
requires use of traditional legal reasoning: open, reasoned
debate over the choice of a substantive standard of law,
and then application of that standard to individual cases.
The decision of whether or not to permit a showing of harm
that will ever be sufficient to justify suppression of
otherwise protected speech, and the nature and degree of
the showing of harm to be required, are issues of general
substantive law that are the proper subject of debate.

109

See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49.

(1969) (per curiam).
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They are to be made openly and consistently; when used as a
justification for regulation of one type of expression, the
harm factor cannot be mysteriously excluded as a measure of
another type of expression, unless some other principled
basis exists for distinguishing between the two types of
expression.

Decision makers employing First Amendment

intuitionism or practical reason, in contrast, make
contextual judgments that do not demand — indeed,
apparently do not permit — attempted application of prior
agreed upon general principles of decision to specific fact
situations.
It is also important to establish that neither
practical reason nor intuitionism is the necessary
outgrowth of a rejection of a single overarching value of
free expression.

One could conceivably conclude that free

expression is appropriately deemed to foster not a single
value but rather a complex intersection of multiple
values,110 yet nevertheless view the creation of free speech

110

Note that it is my view that free expression does, in

fact, serve ultimately only one value — self-realization —
of which all other conceivable values are merely logical
sub-values.

See Redish, The Value of Free Speech, supra

note 37, at 593.

However, reconsideration of that issue is
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doctrine as the application to specific cases of one or
more permutations of those multiple intersecting values.
This process would presumably be no more or less
syllogistic than the shaping of doctrine through the
application of an assumed single underlying value of free
expression to specific cases.

Intuitionism and practical

reason, in contrast, eschew use of any such form of logical
reasoning in favor of what is described – euphemistically –
as a more “contextual” examination.
In the case of commercial speech, decision makers who
choose to employ practical reason and intuitionism are
making their “rough judgment” that commercial speech is not
worthy of protection before the issue of harm caused by the
speech is even considered.

The argument, so far as I can

tell, is not that commercial speech inherently gives rise

unnecessary for present purposes, because even if one were
to accept the notion of a synthesis of multiple free speech
values, the application of traditional legal reason could
still be employed.

Thus, while much of Professor

Weinstein’s response to this article focuses on my
explication of the self-realization value, see Weinstein,
supra note 44, at <<Part III.B>>, that discussion is
largely irrelevant to my argument here.
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to more harm than do more traditionally protected types and
subjects of expression.

The initial question in every

First Amendment case is whether government even needs to
satisfy the compelling interest standard that is triggered
when fully protected expression is sought to be regulated.
Because the intuitionists and practical reason advocates
conclude that, for whatever reason, commercial speech is
not deserving of protection in the first place, they need
never even reach the compelling interest question.

In

light of their initial conclusion, under their approach
there is no First Amendment interest triggering the demand
for a compelling interest.

And their initial conclusion is

never justified by resort to logic or reason that is
applied consistently to all types of expression.

No

justification is provided to which reasoned response can be
made.

Instead, there is simply something “intuitive” that

tells us that, as Jackson and Jeffries asserted, surely “a
seller hawking his wares” deserves no constitutional
protection for his speech.111
One could conceivably seek to defend resort to
intuitionism or practical reason as an alternative to an

111

Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 84, at 14.

discussion supra Part II.C.2.
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See

effort to decide cases on the basis of logic and principle
by challenging the feasibility of the rationalist
enterprise.

It is likely true that principled consistency

will not function like clockwork in every case.

Occasions

will arise, no doubt, where reasonable people could differ
as to how generally agreed upon principles apply to
specific cases.

But to resort to what ultimately amounts

to a form of non-rational subjectivism and intellectual
chaos as an alternative is most assuredly the wrong move.
It is, I suppose, conceivable that I am being unfair
to adherents to practical reason.

Perhaps there is more

“there, there” than I have recognized, and practical reason
in reality involves debate over reasons, albeit from a
purely pragmatic perspective.

But “pragmatic” is a

meaningless concept absent a clear understanding of what
ends one is attempting to achieve in the first place.

If

those ends are determined by anything other than pure
subjective value assessment, then they should be testable
by the application of the standards of principled
consistency: like cases should be decided in a like manner.
Where the asserted reason for excluding commercial speech
from the scope of the First Amendment applies with equal
force to an expressive category to which full protection is
nevertheless extended, there necessarily exists some
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difference other than the asserted principled basis for
exclusion of commercial speech in the first place.

Once

deconstructed, then, all that remains are the subjective
differences in the value preferences of the decision maker
that are most comfortably associated with the instinctive
intuitionism that runs counter to any precept of reasoned
debate.
In the wonderful world of practical reason and First
Amendment intuitionism, none of my previous critiques of
the logical underinclusiveness of the asserted rationalist
justifications for providing reduced protection for
commercial speech demands response or defense.112

No

logical, principled, or reasoned defense of manipulative
underinclusiveness is required when the justification for
the exclusion of commercial speech from the First
Amendment’s protection is, simply, that it somehow
intuitively just does not seem to fit in.

But when one

recognizes the pathetic conceptual inadequacies of such an
approach to First Amendment interpretation and the serious
practical dangers to which it gives rise, the need for
meeting the challenge of commercial speech protection on
the basis of transparency, consistency, and principle will

112

See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
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become inevitable.

As I have demonstrated, there exists no

basis in logic or principle to treat commercial speech
differently from other categories of fully protected
expression.113
3. Ideological Grounds
On relatively rare occasion, scholars have been
mercifully open and candid in evincing academic hostility
towards commercial speech.

These scholars have made fairly

clear that their opposition to the protection of commercial
speech is grounded in their disdain for the expression’s
impact on the functioning of society — in short, their
ideological hostility towards commercial speech.114
ideological rationale can take one of two forms.

This

First, it

may represent a generic ideological rejection of the very
economic system out of which commercial advertising grows.
Second, it may constitute a narrower form of policy
preference that condemns the particular product or service
being promoted by the commercial advertising in question.
The thinking behind this narrower rationale is presumably
that, as a practical matter, the only individuals who

113

See discussion supra Part II.C.1.

114

See, e.g., R. George Wright, Selling Words: Free Speech

in a Commercial Culture 7 (1997).

Page 86 of 140 - Final Production Day

possess sufficient incentive to promote the product or
activity to the public are those seeking to sell it.

Thus,

to stop the commercial advertising is tantamount to halting
all promotion of the use of the product or service.

Under

such a regulatory approach, it would make perfect sense to
extend full protection to the speech of those attacking the
product or service, but either no protection or only
limited protection to speech promoting its purchase or use,
simply because the former category of expression furthers
the predetermined policy goal while the latter undermines
it.
The problem with either of the conceivable forms of an
ideological or policy-based rationale is, as I have argued
throughout this article, that both of them are
fundamentally inconsistent with the core premises of a
system of meaningful free speech protection and the
democratic structure of which free expression is a central
element.

Surely, the Supreme Court today would not

countenance a law restricting pro-socialist expression on
the grounds that those in power believe that socialism is
unwise or immoral and fear that such expression might lead
to society’s adoption of socialist precepts.

Nor would it

uphold a law restricting anti-socialist expression because
those in power have deemed socialism to be the preferred
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social economic theory.

Under such a blatantly viewpoint-

based form of selective protection, the control of
expression would be reduced to nothing more than a struggle
for political power.

Whichever side attains political

power would presumably be able to constitutionally shut off
all expression that it found to be ideologically
distasteful or in disagreement with the currently
predominating ideology.
Nevertheless, critics of commercial speech have on
occasion openly acknowledged the relevance to their
analysis of either ideologically oriented concerns or
subjective social or political values.

For example, R.

George Wright, a strong and articulate opponent of
commercial speech protection, argued: “[C]ommercial getting
and spending is, except in the case of the poor, at best
weakly correlated with happiness or well-being.”115

He

further expressed concern over “the ways in which
commercialism and commercial values affect how we
experience the otherwise noncommercial elements of our
lives.”116

Wright thus overtly demonstrated his subjective

115

Id.

116

Id. at 6.

Page 88 of 140 - Final Production Day

ideological distaste for commercial speech as a predicate
for his attack on its constitutional protection.
Reliance on such ideological motivations effectively
reduces free speech doctrine to a Hobbesian state of
nature, in which there exists a political war of all
against all.117

In such circumstances, whichever

ideological camp attains political power may, quite
legitimately, suppress the speech of its opposition on no
grounds other than naked distaste for the political
viewpoints expressed in that speech.

However, life in such

a constitutional state of nature is, as Hobbes warned,
likely to be nasty, brutish, and short.

As a theoretical

matter, then, preference for a particular ideology should
never play any part in justifying governmental restriction
of expression.
4. Objections to Commercial Speech Protection and
the Parameters of Neutral Principles
Each of the three categories of objections to
commercial speech protection — rationalist, intuitionist,
and ideological — is seriously flawed in a variety of ways.
The primary concern with the three categories, however, is
not merely the manner in which each is flawed, but rather
117

Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan 185 (C.B. MacPherson ed.,

Penguin Books 1968)(1651).
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the way in which each threatens the core values underlying
free speech protection.

It is my contention that in

attempting to construe the First Amendment, each of the
three categories, in its own way, largely represents a form
of impermissible viewpoint discrimination that undermines
the very core of what the First Amendment is all about.
Admittedly, these are rather strong words.

But it is, I

believe, reasonable to conclude that each of the three
categories of objections is ultimately grounded in distaste
for what commercial speech facilitates and represents, in a
manner wholly unrelated to a properly value-neutral
approach to First Amendment interpretation.
The reflexive response to my suggestion, no doubt, is
that one cannot demand value neutrality in First Amendment
interpretation.

To the contrary, the argument proceeds,

First Amendment construction necessarily involves a choice
among values that free speech protection is designed to
foster.

This is no doubt true.

However, the value

neutrality that is necessarily implicated in First
Amendment analysis differs fundamentally from the form of
value invocation triggered by the three categories of
objections to commercial speech protection.

As I have

already demonstrated, those objections are not premised on
a plausible selection of one conceivable free speech value
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over another.

If they were, the objections would be

applied consistently to the protection of other types of
expression which readily receive full constitutional
protection.118

Rather, they are grounded in the decision

maker’s preference for particular political or ideological
value preferences that would, in the decision maker’s view,
be threatened or undermined by the extension of
constitutional protection to commercial speech.
Recognition of these two levels of value analysis is
essential to an understanding of the judiciary’s
appropriate role in enforcing First Amendment protections.
The essence of this distinction in levels of value
analysis is embodied in and policed by the doctrinally
well-established prohibition on viewpoint-based
discrimination.

Therefore, I now turn to a description and

analysis of this core First Amendment doctrine.

III. Viewpoint Discrimination and the Foundations of Free
Expression

A.

The Uniquely Invidious Nature of Viewpoint
Discrimination

118

See discussion supra Part II.C.1.d.
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How absolute the First Amendment is has long been the
subject of scholarly and judicial debate.119

What should

not — and, for the most part, has not — been the subject of
serious dispute is that regulation of expression that is
grounded in nothing more than governmental hostility to the
normative viewpoint to be expressed is unqualifiedly
unconstitutional.

There can be no exceptions to the

constitutional bar of viewpoint-based regulations — at
least in the context of coercive regulations and
prohibitions120 — because to permit one exception is
effectively to permit all viewpoint-based regulations.121

119

Compare N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,

720 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (First Amendment is
absolute), and Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is
an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 246-48 (1961) (First
Amendment protection of political speech is absolute), with
Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment:
Absolutes in the Balance, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 821, 825 (1962)
(First Amendment requires use of balancing approach).
120

At the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review’s oral

symposium, Professor Post pointed out that presumably
President Bush could fire Secretary of State Rice for
suggesting the Iraq War was a mistake without violating the
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First Amendment, even though it would have, of course, been
due to the expression of her viewpoint.

Robert C. Post,

Remarks at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium:
Commercial Speech: Past, Present, and Future (Feb. 24,
2007) [hereinafter Post, Symposium Remarks].
concede the point.

I fully

However, losing the position of

Secretary of State because of expression of one’s viewpoint
implicates an entirely distinct area of First Amendment
analysis concerning government subsidies and benefits — a
subject on which both Professor Post and I have written.
See Redish, Money Talks, supra note 18, at 196-231; Robert
C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 Yale L.J. 151, 152-53
(1996).

I refer here entirely to the more traditional and

prevalent First Amendment context of directly coercive
government regulation of expression.

Surely the fact that

a President can fire a cabinet officer for expressing
unpopular views does not in any way imply that government
can place a private citizen in jail for expressing a
similarly unpopular view.

I cannot imagine that Professor

Post would disagree with this uncontroversial assertion.
121

At the oral symposium, Professor Post suggested that

numerous regulations of viewpoint are permitted, consistent
with the First Amendment.

Post, Symposium Remarks.
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In

In every conceivable instance, a viewpoint-based
regulation of expression is, by definition, grounded not in
a principled effort to interpret and apply the structural
values underlying the free speech protection, but rather in
a subjective assessment of moral and/or socio-political
considerations that are external to the First Amendment.
These considerations necessarily grow out of normative
concerns that exist wholly beyond the boundaries of the
First Amendment.

This is so, because the First Amendment’s

immediate focus is on allowing the private individual or
entity, not the government, to decide what is normatively
dictated.

The viewpoint neutrality of the First

attempting to support his assertion, however, Professor
Post evinced substantial confusion over the nature of the
viewpoint discrimination concept.

Post, Symposium Remarks.

For example, he pointed to the fact that a doctor may be
penalized for incorrectly reporting to a patient that a
lesion was not cancerous.

Id.

This example, however, has

absolutely nothing to do with the concept of viewpoint
discrimination as employed in First Amendment analysis.
That concept is confined to governmental penalizations of
expression for no reason other than disagreement with or
disdain for the normative views expressed.
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Amendment’s free-expression guarantee is the logical
outgrowth of the nation’s original commitment to
democratically based rule.

As a definitional matter, a

democratic form of government means that the electorate
possesses the fundamental freedom to choose those who will
govern day-to-day policy choices.122

Moreover, the

electorate is even permitted to alter the counter-simple
majoritarian limits imposed by the Constitution by resort
to the super-majoritarian amendment process.123
Free expression, as Alexander Meiklejohn told us,
facilitates performance of the self-governing function by

122

See J. Roland Pennock, Democratic Political Theory 310

(1979) (“Elections are thought to constitute the great
sanction for assuring representative behavior, by showing
what the voters consider to be their interests by giving
them the incentive to pursue those objectives.”); Henry
Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory 103 (1960)
(“[E]verything necessary to [democratic] theory may be put
in terms of (a) legislation (or decision-makers) who are
(b) legitimated or authorized to enact public policies, and
who are (c) subject or responsible to popular control at
free election.”).
123

See U.S. Const. art. V.
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providing the electorate with information and opinion
concerning policy making choices that will face those
chosen to serve.124

Since the electorate possesses the

ultimate authority to put candidates into office who take
any position, it logically follows that those in power
cannot be permitted to manipulate the political debate in a
manner designed strategically to control the available
scope of governmental choices.

Any other result would

simultaneously undermine the individual citizen’s integrity
as a free-thinking human being worthy of respect.

It would

also effectively gut the operation of the democratic
process of which the First Amendment is a logical
outgrowth.

124

Meiklejohn, supra note 38, at 24-25.

Note that many

commentators, including myself, believe the First Amendment
does far more than this.

See generally Redish, The Value

of Free Speech, supra note 37 (First Amendment fosters
self-realization).

However, at the very least, the First

Amendment must be deemed to protect the expression that
influences and facilitates the voter’s democratic choice in
the voting booth.

For present purposes, we need not take

the argument further.
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The absoluteness of the constitutional prohibition on
viewpoint discrimination flows from recognition of the
unique harm that such regulations necessarily cause to the
foundations of free expression.

It is impossible, ex ante,

to authorize exceptions to this prohibition because the
content of those exceptions would have to be determined by
those in power; it is those in power who would necessarily
determine which viewpoints were to be deemed so offensive
as to justify suppression of their expression.

Presumably,

they would choose to exempt regulations of those particular
viewpoints that, as a subjective matter, they found the
most offensive.

If power were to be subsequently

transferred to another group with a different set of
ideological preferences, the exemptions to the
constitutional prohibition on viewpoint discrimination
would be changed to comport with the subjective preferences
of that group.
For example, if conservatives were in power, they
might well deem sufficiently offensive, as to justify
exemption from the bar against viewpoint discrimination,
expression of viewpoints such as that a woman should have a
right to choose to obtain an abortion, or that the United
States is fundamentally an evil nation, or even that we
should retreat from Iraq.

If the political left were to

Page 97 of 140 - Final Production Day

replace the conservatives in power, viewpoints exempted
from the bar against discrimination might well be changed
to include expression of the view that abortion is murder
or that affirmative action is evil.

Perhaps there are

certain moral views that are so widely accepted that
expression of a contrary view would universally be deemed
offensive.

In such an event, the role of the First

Amendment as a protection of unpopular views would be
gutted.

Put bluntly, the decision as to which viewpoints

could be exempted from the regulatory bar would inevitably
be determined by the political agenda of those in power.
The end result, therefore, would be a political jungle in
which those in power are able to suppress the expression of
those whose views they find deeply offensive.

Thus,

whatever one believes about the absolutism of free speech
protection in other contexts, the bar against viewpointbased regulations must be deemed absolute, lest it not
exist at all.125

125

For a thoughtful explanation of the constitutional

prohibition on viewpoint regulation, see generally Geoffrey
R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content:
The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 81 (1978).

For an explanation of the
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The most fascinating aspect of the constitutional
world of viewpoint discrimination is that it is
simultaneously so obvious as a core element of First
Amendment theory and so counterintuitive — and often
devastating — to those operating in the real world, away
from the lofty heights of constitutional theory.126 The

prohibition on viewpoint discrimination from the
perspective of equal protection theory, see generally
Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the
First Amendment, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 20 (1975).
126

In his response to this Article, Professor Post contends

that the concept of viewpoint discrimination, as I describe
it, is too vague and convoluted to be of much help in First
Amendment analysis.

Robert C. Post, Remarks at the Loyola

of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Commercial Speech:
Past, Present, and Future (Feb. 24, 2007), in 41 Loy. L.A.
L. Rev. <<page>>, <<pincite>> (2007).
puzzling, to say the least.

I find the assertion

While it is true that

Professor Post appears to have difficulty getting his arms
around the concept, see supra note 121, as the sources
cited supra note 125 make clear the concept of viewpoint
discrimination is both well established and well understood
in First Amendment theory.

See also Farber, supra note 37,
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classic illustration is the Skokie case of the late 1970s,
where a ragged — but, to most, understandably highly
offensive — band of Nazis sought to march in a Chicago
suburb with a large Jewish population (including, at the
time, many concentration camp survivors).127

The courts

that dealt with challenges to Skokie ordinances designed to
prevent the march were quite clear about their
unconstitutionality, whatever distaste they may have had
for the political message of the march.128 This conclusion
was constitutionally dictated because any other result
would have led to normative censorship by those in power —
a result wholly inconsistent with the foundations and
premises of a democratic society.
That the bar to viewpoint-based discrimination must be
deemed absolute, however, is of little help in recognizing

at 577 (“In First Amendment jurisprudence, restrictions
based on viewpoint are especially suspect.”) (footnote
omitted).
127

Vill. of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 69 Ill.

2d 605, 610 (1978).
128

Id. at 618-19; Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1207 (7th

Cir. 1978).
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when a regulation of expression is viewpoint based and when
it is not.

It is to this question that I now turn.

B. Defining and Recognizing Viewpoint Discrimination
1. The Essential Characteristic of Viewpoint
Discrimination
On a purely conceptual level, viewpoint discrimination
is not difficult to distinguish from more principled forms
of First Amendment selectivity — even those forms with
which one ultimately disagrees as a matter of free speech
theory.

Disputes over the scope of First Amendment

protection grounded in principle concern factors that are
“internal” to the First Amendment.

The debate over which

principled means of construing the First Amendment, in
other words, will concern one of two issues: (1) the extent
to which the expression in question is deemed to foster the
value or values that underlie the guarantee of free
expression or (2) the extent to which the harm that the
expression would likely give rise to justifies restriction.
Viewpoint discrimination, on the other hand, is
grounded in considerations that are “external” to the First
Amendment.

By this assertion, I mean that the driving

normative force has nothing to do with a good faith effort
to determine the process or structural values of free
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expression.

Rather, it flows from normative premises

determined by entirely unrelated factors of political,
social, economic, moral, or religious beliefs or concerns
that are wholly external to the First Amendment itself.
They grow not out of the process-based analysis that seeks
to create the most viable or appropriate constitutional
system, but rather from unrelated personal beliefs of those
imposing the restriction.

To those seeking to impose

viewpoint discrimination, the First Amendment is not
something to be deciphered and structured, but rather a
potential obstacle to attainment of their political or
ideological values and goals that needs to be circumvented.
While this dichotomy seems relatively easy to
recognize on a purely conceptual level, it is not always a
simple task to separate legitimate, principled (if
controversial) constitutional analysis, on the one hand,
from invidious viewpoint discrimination that grows out of
normative premises wholly unrelated to constitutional
analysis, on the other.

As the following sections

demonstrate, however, certain guideposts may be recognized
to help draw this vitally important distinction in the
First Amendment trenches of real world adjudication.
2. Viewpoint Discrimination and the Avoidance of
“Harm”
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In its starkest form, viewpoint discrimination is
relatively easy to recognize.

Classic illustrations are

not difficult to hypothesize: a law prohibiting speech that
argues against the government’s Iraq policy; a law
prohibiting expression advocating (or opposing) abortion
rights; or a law prohibiting anti-capitalist advocacy.
When such cases have arisen, the Supreme Court has
generally been quick to strike them down.129

129

A problem

See, e.g., Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62-63

(1970) (holding unconstitutional a congressional ban on the
unauthorized wearing of American military uniforms in a
manner calculated to discredit the armed forces); Good News
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001)
(holding that a school’s exclusion of a Christian
children’s club from meeting after hours at school, based
on its religious nature, was unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S.
533, 549 (2001) (finding unconstitutional a restriction
that prohibited funding to organizations that represented
clients seeking to challenge existing welfare laws);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 835-37 (1995) (holding that a university’s denial
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quickly arises, however, when supporters of the selectively
based restriction reflexively invoke the fear of “harm”
that might result from allowing the regulated expression.
After all, if expression is being suppressed or punished in
order to prevent “harm,” then it is not being regulated
simply to quiet expression of an offensive viewpoint.
Surely, the argument would proceed; a constitutional
prohibition on viewpoint regulation would not prevent the
government from punishing advocacy of violent criminal
behavior.

Sloppy or conclusory invocation of the threat of

harm as a justification for suppression, then, could easily
consume the beneficial impact of the constitutional
prohibition on viewpoint regulation.
There exist three ways in which this danger can be
averted.

First, at the outset it is important to

distinguish between “harms” that flow from illegal or
extra-legal behavior, on the one hand, and harms that would
flow from either lawful behavior or from efforts to bring
about proper governmental alteration of existing law.
Surely, individuals have a First Amendment right to urge a
governmental body — judicial, legislative, or executive —

of funds to a religious organization amounted to viewpoint
discrimination).
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to alter existing legal standards, even if those currently
in power would find that such legal changes lead to
normatively unacceptable results.

For example, if the

First Amendment means anything at all, it must protect an
individual’s right to urge that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,130 finding
unconstitutional so-called “separate-but-equal” laws,
should be overruled, even though most of us no doubt would
be morally outraged by such a reversal.

An individual must

also possess a First Amendment right to urge Congress to
repeal Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,131
prohibiting racial, religious, or gender-based
discrimination in private hiring, though, once again, most
of us today would (hopefully) find such a change in the law
morally repugnant.

On a political level, one could easily

oppose such proposals on the ground that their acceptance
would cause significant “harm” to racial minorities or
women.

But for the First Amendment to work, “harm” that is

considered sufficiently severe to justify suppression
cannot be defined to include bringing about a distasteful,
albeit lawful, political result.

130

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

131

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e17 (2000).
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Second, the courts must be wary of laws that seek to
avoid harm by resorting to a suspiciously underinclusive
invocation of the danger of harm.

Once again, the example

of an ordinance prohibiting distribution of anti-war
literature on Michigan Avenue in Chicago during rush hour
because of the danger of harm cannot be permitted to stand
unless all forms and subjects of expression at the same
time and place are also banned.

The same would be true of

an attempt to justify a law making criminal the burning of
the American flag on grounds that such action would give
rise to a serious fire hazard.

Finally, we should demand

that any claim of even potential unlawful harm be
established not as some vague, undefined possible injury at
some point in the unspecified future, but rather as a more
definite and proximate threat.132

This is the goal of the

“clear and present danger” test, currently embodied, for

132

For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Martin

H. Redish, The Logic of Persecution: Free Expression and
the McCarthy Era 63-131 (2005) [hereinafter Redish, The
Logic of Persecution].
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the most part, in controlling Supreme Court doctrine in its
most protective form.133
3. Recognizing the Different Forms of Viewpoint
Discrimination
Unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination is not
always as direct or obvious as many of the examples
described in the prior section.

Those are situations in

which the government sought to regulate expression of a
specific viewpoint, regardless of who was expressing it.
The perceived offensiveness of the words themselves,
standing alone, were what triggered suppression.

Other,

less obvious or direct situations of viewpoint regulation,
however, will arise, and it is important to see them as
equally invidious forms of speech regulation.
One example of such indirect viewpoint regulation
could be described as a type of “heckler’s veto.”

In these

situations, government will prohibit expression of
derogatory comments about a particular ethnic, racial or
religious group, even where the speech in question is not
spoken directly to a member of one of those groups and

133

See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969)

(per curiam).
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lacks any immediately coercive quality,134 for no reason
other than that the speech is thought to be demoralizing or
hurtful to the affected group.

Here the governmental

regulator is effectively operating as the agent of the
affected group.

Even more clear are classic “heckler’s

veto” situations, where government suppresses speech
because of fear that others who hear it will be so offended
that they threaten harm to the speaker.

Here, too, the

regulator is operating as a type of agent for those who are
likely to find the speaker’s views offensive.

A viable

system of free expression could not possibly function under
such a framework.

At most, reliance on these concerns to

justify suppression could be accepted only in the most
compelling of immediate, narrowly defined circumstances,
where authorities reasonably conclude that they would be
unable to prevent serious violence.

134

In this context, it is important to emphasize that I am

in no way suggesting that harassing or coercive speech,
said to unwilling listeners, is protected by the First
Amendment.

For a discussion of my position on this issue,

see Redish, The Logic of Persecution, supra note 132, at
123-26.

Page 108 of 140 - Final Production Day

A second form of indirect viewpoint discrimination
occurs where government suppresses speech not because of
the words of the speech, but because of who the speaker is.
For example, a law prohibiting Democrats from speaking
should still be deemed invidious viewpoint discrimination,
even though it does not directly focus on the expression of
a particular viewpoint.

In this example, the restriction

of expression turns not at all on the specific words that
the Democrat would utter.

But focus on the nature of the

speaker here serves as a relatively simple surrogate for
viewpoint discrimination.

The speaker is prohibited from

speaking on the basis of his or her pre-existing
ideological association.
Since these regulations go to the speaker and not the
speech, it might be suggested that their
unconstitutionality is more appropriately grounded in the
Equal Protection Clause,135 rather than the First Amendment

135

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.

Though the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause does not
apply to the federal government, the Supreme Court has held
that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is properly
construed to contain a prohibition on equal protection
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right of free expression.136
result would be the same.

Nonetheless, I suppose the end

I believe, however, that the

First Amendment, standing on its own, appropriately
invalidates such a law as invidious viewpoint
discrimination.

The fact that the viewpoint regulation is

one step removed from the expression itself should make no
difference, because the right of the speaker to speak is
being “abridged” as a result of his pre-existing
ideological and political expressive associations — which
is the core concern of the ban on viewpoint regulations.

4. Judicially Imposed Viewpoint Regulation
The judiciary, like the other branches of government,
is constrained by the First Amendment.137

violations.

It is therefore

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99

(1954).
136

U.S. Const. amend I.

For an attempt to intertwine the

Equal Protection and Free Speech clauses, see Karst, supra
note 125, at 26-29.

See also Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408

U.S. 92, 94-98 (1972).
137

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964)

(stating judicial imposition of liability in libel suits
may implicate First Amendment protection).
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conceivable that the actions of the judicial branch, as
easily as the executive or legislative branches of
government, may contravene the First Amendment’s absolute
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination.
Judicial action can potentially interact with
viewpoint discrimination in either of two ways: (1) by
condoning or facilitating implementation of viewpoint
discrimination initially imposed by one or both of the
majoritarian branches of government, or (2) by shaping or
applying First Amendment doctrine selectively, where no
principled basis for such a disparity in First Amendment
treatment — apart from the differences in viewpoint —
exists to justify such distinctions.

It is important to

recognize, then, that the judiciary may well be the
culprit, and not merely the enabler.

The difference in

judicial culpability can be best understood by use of a
hypothetical example.

First, imagine an action taken by

one or both of the political branches selectively
discriminating against expression of one viewpoint.

If the

judiciary upholds this discrimination against First
Amendment attack, it will have acted as an enabler.

Now

imagine a law that indiscriminately restricts expressive
activity by all.

Were the courts to uphold that law

against constitutional attack against speech expressing one
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viewpoint but invalidate it as to the expression of a
different viewpoint, the judiciary itself would be imposing
the viewpoint discrimination.
5. Recognizing the “Twilight Zone” of
Viewpoint Discrimination
To this point, my descriptions, explanation, and
analysis of the concept of viewpoint discrimination, while
hopefully illuminating, should hardly be considered
controversial to theorists of the First Amendment.

Few, if

any, knowledgeable observers would dispute the inherently
invidious nature of viewpoint-based discrimination in light
of the manner in which it inevitably undermines the values
served by democracy and the system of free expression of
which it is a part.

However, there exists a form of

viewpoint discrimination that may not be as readily
recognized as either the direct, indirect, or judicial
forms of the First Amendment pathology described to this
point.

I refer to this category as “twilight zone”

viewpoint discrimination, because the resulting invidious
harms to free speech interests are just as great as the
more classic forms of the category, even though they are,
superficially, one or two steps removed.
What distinguishes twilight zone viewpoint
discrimination from the more classic variety is the fact
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that it focuses on neither the normative positions taken in
the substance of the regulated speech (direct viewpoint
discrimination) nor the ideological or political
affiliations of the speaker (indirect viewpoint
discrimination).

It is, rather, grounded in hostility

towards what might be called, for lack of a better phrase,
the “ideological ether” of which both the speech and the
speaker are a part.

In these situations, the speaker

herself may have no ex ante offensive socio-political
affiliations, and what she says, in and of itself, asserts
nothing to which the regulator is normatively hostile.
However, both the speaker and the speech are themselves
outgrowths of, and participants in, a broader communicative
process which the regulator finds offensive on ideological
grounds.

Of course, if the speaker and the speech are part

of a broader non-expressive, conduct-based activity deemed
harmful by those in authority, the government may prohibit
the relevant conduct, consistent with constitutional
protections other than the First Amendment.

In so doing,

the government may sweep within its reach any communicative
activity that forms an essential element of that conduct,
subject, I suppose, to whatever limited First Amendment
protection is extended to advocacy of unlawful conduct.
But where the primary or intended impact is on expression

Page 113 of 140 - Final Production Day

or communication, the fact that regulatory hostility
focuses not on the specific speech or speaker, but rather
on the ideological foundations of the system of which the
speech and speaker are an inherent part, does not alter the
invidious viewpoint discriminatory character of the
expressive regulation.

As in the case of classic viewpoint

discrimination, government is regulating expression on the
basis of ideological hostility, and for that reason it is
seeking to prevent communications among private individuals
or entities.

As in the case of classic viewpoint

discrimination, penalizing expression is premised on
grounds wholly external to the First Amendment and
government is selectively restricting expression in an
attempt to foster one ideology and hinder another.
It is probable that relatively few categories of
twilight zone viewpoint regulation exist.

But this fact

makes them no less problematic when they do actually occur.
One example of this category is obscenity.

When government

suppresses or punishes obscene publications, it is likely
that the neither the regulated expression nor the speaker
have directly assumed an ideological position found
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offensive by the regulators.138

For example, regulated

obscenity usually does not, on its face, urge creation of a
society characterized by free love.

Were government to

prohibit expression of the view that society should adopt
such a free love system, I imagine a court would have to
strike the prohibition down as unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination.

However, both the speaker and the

expression are outgrowths of a system whose essential
premise is, if not free love, at the very least a belief in
a significant loosening of societal mores about sex.
Suppression of obscene expression, then, grows out of
regulatory hostility towards the moral and socio-political
premises implicitly advocated by the obscene communication.
The regulatory hostility is effectively directed at the
“ideological ether” surrounding the obscenity.

If

government may not punish expression that voices a
particular ideological position, the same logic should

138

To avoid triggering potentially intractable

complications involving the speech-conduct dichotomy, I
refer here solely to obscene publications that do not
include photographic depictions of real individuals.

I

thus confine the discussion to pure narrative or artistic
renderings.
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prevent it from punishing such “satellite” expression
because of hostility to that ideological position.
The one conceivable distinction between direct
regulation of expression of the ideological position itself
and regulation of such satellite expression is the
possibility that the satellite expression gives rise to
harm to which direct ideological advocacy does not.
Advocacy of violent overthrow, for example, is surely not
the same thing as an actual attempt to overthrow.

But as

long as we are speaking solely of satellite expression
rather than conduct, and the harms that allegedly flow from
both ideology and satellite expression are basically
communicative in nature, this distinction should be deemed
irrelevant.

In the case of obscenity, for example,

government would seek to control obscene narratives for
much the same reason that it would seek to prohibit
advocacy of free love.

In both situations, government

regulates because it does not wish to allow private
individuals to decide for themselves whether to alter their
mores in ways found offensive by those in power.

IV. Commercial Speech and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint
Discrimination

Page 116 of 140 - Final Production Day

A. Commercial Speech as Twilight Zone Viewpoint
Regulation
As in the case of obscenity, exclusion of commercial
speech from the protective scope of the First Amendment
could conceivably be characterized as a form of twilight
zone viewpoint discrimination.

If, for purposes of

argument, we assume that exclusion of commercial speech
from the First Amendment’s protective scope is based on
something other than either principled constitutional
analysis or at least a flawed attempt to employ principled
constitutional analysis,139 the only alternative is to
assume that it grows out of some form of hostility to or
disdain for the capitalist system of which commercial
speech is a part.

While exceptions may exist, political

hostility to commercial speech will usually not be grounded
in either the ideological affiliations of the speaker or in
any ideological viewpoint expressed in the substance of the
regulated speech.

But if the basis for the exclusion of

commercial speech grows not out of a principled “internal”
analysis of First Amendment value, but rather from
political or socio-economic hostility to the capitalist
system of which commercial speech is a part, then the

139

See discussion supra, Part II.C.1.b-f.
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discriminatory treatment given commercial speech is
appropriately characterized as an invidious form of
viewpoint discrimination.
Am I suggesting that any jurist or scholar who opposes
full First Amendment protection for commercial speech is
necessarily engaged in the surreptitious and manipulative
process of stratifying First Amendment protection in order
to furtively undermine capitalism?

As a practical matter,

it would be difficult to maintain this position, given that
several jurists associated with the political right have
consistently opposed full First Amendment protection for
commercial speech.140

There are, to be sure, scholars and

jurists who have no moral, economic, or political problem
with the capitalist system, but who strongly believe in

140

See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens

Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (believing that the Court’s
decision to extend First Amendment protection to commercial
endeavors is troublesome); Richard A. Posner, Free Speech
in an Economic Perspective, 20 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1, 22
n.43, 39-40 (1986) (stating that because commercial speech
does not produce significant external benefits it should be
afforded less constitutional protection).
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generally limiting countermajoritarian judicial
interference in decisions of the democratic process.141
These jurists or scholars — Judge Bork, for example — may
consistently seek to confine First Amendment protection
narrowly to speech directly affecting the political
process.142

I may well conclude that such skimpy protection

of free expression is grossly underprotective,143 but it
would be difficult to characterize their rejection of
commercial speech protection as a form of furtive
manipulation.
Scholars or jurists who reject full First Amendment
protection for commercial speech, but simultaneously extend
such protection to other forms of non-political,
economically motivated expression, must fall into one of

141

See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some

First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 20 (1971)
(“Constitutional protection should be accorded only to
speech that is explicitly political.”).
142

See id.

143

See generally Redish, The Value of Free Speech, supra

note 37 (arguing that any expression, political or not,
that enhances the self-realization value should be
permitted full First Amendment protection).
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two categories.

First, they may incorrectly fail to

recognize the inescapable intellectual inconsistency in
their positions.

Second, they may be employing a form of

indirect, twilight zone viewpoint discrimination.

There is

no third alternative for scholars or jurists who purport to
employ a rationalist approach to First Amendment
interpretation.

To the extent these jurists reject

commercial speech protection, I am forced to conclude that,
at least to the extent that they simultaneously would
protect other forms of equally non-political or
economically motivated expression, they have incorrectly
drawn logically indefensible distinctions in their efforts
to avoid judicial disruption of democratically ordained
choices.
To the extent observers choose to exclude commercial
speech from First Amendment protection by resorting to some
form of intuitive, non-rationalist process, it is
conceivable that they do not themselves even realize that
they are actually implementing a form of implicit viewpoint
discrimination.

Ultimately, my argument comes down to

this: unless an observer who chooses to reduce protection
for commercial advertising (1) simultaneously reduces
protection for Consumer Reports and consumer advocate
groups, (2) rejects or reduces protection for political
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speech motivated by goals of personal gain on behalf of the
speaker, or (3) puts forth a consistent, coherent, nonviewpoint based justification for drawing such a First
Amendment distinction (a justification I have yet to hear),
his or her refusal to protect commercial speech, at the
very least, must be considered presumptively either an
illustration of viewpoint-based discrimination or simply a
failure to understand the inescapable logical implications
of their analysis.
The viewpoint discrimination that may well plague the
arguments for reduced protection of commercial speech
constitutes a synthesis of two categories of
discrimination: twilight zone discrimination and judicially
imposed discrimination.144

It belongs in the twilight zone

category for the reasons just described.145

It also belongs

in the judicially imposed category, however, because those
urging the reduction or exclusion are doing so not in the
form of legislative or executive discrimination, but rather
through the judicial exclusion of commercial speech from
the First Amendment’s protective scope.

While this

exclusion will of course facilitate legislative or

144

See discussion supra Part III.B.4-5.

145

See supra text accompanying notes 139-143.
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executive discriminations, even standing alone it
represents an unconstitutional, judicially imposed
discrimination against a form of expression.

Moreover,

such judicial discrimination is an ideologically based
hostility grounded in something other than an internal,
principled analysis and implementation of free speech
values.

It is as if the Court invalidated a ban on

picketing by pro-choice demonstrators but not on an
identical ban on picketing by pro-life demonstrators.
The viewpoint based nature of the segregation of
commercial speech is especially underscored in situations
in which a commercial enterprise is enmeshed in a dispute
about its product or service with consumer advocates or
members of the media.

Take, for example, Ralph Nader’s

attack on the safety of the Chevrolet Corvair.146

No one,

it is fair to suppose, would suggest that Nader possessed
anything short of full First Amendment protection for his
critical comments.

However, were General Motors to attempt

to defend its product’s safety in response to Nader’s
attacks, automatically its comments are transformed into

146

See, e.g., Ralph Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed 3-41 (1965).
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lesser protected — or unprotected147 — commercial speech.
The same is true of the more recent dispute between the
media and Nike.

When New York Times columnist Bob Herbert

criticizes Nike for using near slave labor in third world
countries to manufacturer its sneakers,148 again no one

147

Earlier in this Article, I suggested that the Supreme

Court has in practice, if not in name, extended full First
Amendment protection to commercial speech.
4-5 and accompanying text.

See supra notes

But it is only with respect to

truthful commercial speech that this is the case.

The

protections of the “actual malice” test of New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), are denied to
commercial speech, while they are extended to false noncommercial speech.

Also, as previously noted, a number of

highly respected scholars have argued that, contrary to the
view of the Court, commercial speech is entirely
undeserving of First Amendment protection.

See supra note

19.
148

Bob Herbert, In America: Nike’s Pyramid Scheme, N.Y.

Times, Jun. 10, 1996, at A17; Bob Herbert, In America: The
Wrong Indonesian, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1996, at A35; Bob
Herbert, In America: Nike Blinks, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1998,
at A33.
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could question the extension of full First Amendment
protection to his statements.

But when Nike seeks to

respond, because it is effectively promoting sales of its
product, its constitutional protection is reduced.149

In

these situations, as Justice Scalia has accurately
analogized in a different context, one side has to fight
according to the Marquis of Queensbury Rules while the
other side can gouge or hit below the belt.150

149

And the

Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2003), cert.

granted, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003), and cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
150

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992)

(plurality opinion).

At the oral symposium that gave rise

to this issue of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, it
was suggested that a rational basis for distinguishing
between Nike and its accusers is that Nike has special
access to knowledge on the question, and a significant
degree of power and access for the expression of its views.
Remarks at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium:
Commercial Speech: Past, Present, and Future (Feb. 24,
2007).

But much the same could be said of one of its

primary attackers, Bob Herbert of the New York Times.
one can doubt the Times’ power and access in the media
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No

world.

And while of course Herbert cannot be assumed to

have the same access to information about Nike as Nike
itself does, one can reasonably wonder why, if he lacks
adequate information about Nike, he is making accusations
in the first place.

Moreover, under Sullivan’s actual

malice test, Herbert cannot be held liable for product
defamation even if he was grossly negligent in making the
accusations.

It is unclear why a lack of comparative

access to information should insulate such grossly
negligent behavior — except, of course, for the fact that
we place a premium on free expression.

It is a mystery why

we would not provide equal breathing room, even for an
individual or entity with presumably superior access.
Moreover, to suggest that Nike’s arguable superiority in
access to information logically leads to using a standard
tougher than actual malice misses the point.

The issue,

from the perspective of the chilling effect concern evinced
in N.Y. Times, is not what Nike does or does not know, but
rather what Nike will be chilled from saying because of use
of the stricter standard of liability.

In any event, under

the actual malice test, Nike’s superior access to
information would simply mean it would be easier to
establish its knowledge of falsity.
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viewpoint always afforded the lesser level of protection is
the pro-business side of the debate.

It would be

impossible to hypothesize a starker illustration of
intentional and invidious viewpoint discrimination —
discrimination that takes place only because of the reduced
protection given to commercial speech.
Whether the urged exclusion or reduction of commercial
speech protection necessarily derives from “external”
ideological hostility is another matter.

It should be

recalled that a number of rationalist arguments have been
or could be made to support a principled internally

Most importantly, in no other context of First
Amendment analysis do we ever impose comparative gradations
of protection on the basis of the relative power of the
speaker or the speaker’s access to information.

Resort to

this rationale to justify the outrageous disparity in
protection in Nike, then, only goes to underscore the
discriminatory treatment received by those speakers who
advocate purchase of their product or service.
In any event, Consumer Reports rarely lacks for
either power or information access.

Yet Consumer Reports

is all but universally extended full First Amendment
protection by courts and commentators.
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grounded basis for a reduction in commercial speech
protection.

But as already demonstrated, even if they are

assumed to be valid bases for reduced protection in the
abstract, these asserted distinctions are inevitably
applied in an irrationally underinclusive manner.151

One

cannot, for example, rely on the ground that commercial
speech involves matters not worthy of First Amendment
concern, because it is almost universally accepted that
Consumer Reports, which focuses on identical issues,
receives full protection.

Nor can one rely on the ground

that commercial speech is motivated by base concerns of
personal economic gain, because much fully protected
expression is also motivated, largely or exclusively, by
personal economic gain.

The exclusion cannot be premised

on the ground that in commercial speech cases the speaker
is a profit making corporation, because much expression by
profit making corporations is fully protected in other
contexts.

Finally, an equally insufficient basis for

exclusion is that commercial speech, because of its
inherently self-interested nature, will always be
misleading due to its strategically motivated selectiveness

151

See discussion supra Part II.C.1.a-f.
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and slant.

The exact same thing can be said of any form of

advocacy that is fully protected by the First Amendment.
Perhaps both Post and Weinstein could respond that
strategically selective political expression is protected
not for its informational value but because it represents a
speaker’s participation in “public discourse.”
that response no more satisfactory.

But I find

They have failed to

explain why speech contributing to “public discourse” is
deserving of greater protection, and they have failed to
explain exactly what the concept of “public discourse” even
means.

The argument that allowing speech contributing to

public discourse increases “legitimacy” of the system is
conclusory and unhelpful, because they have failed to
explain by reference to what normative standard of
political theory they are measuring the concept of
legitimacy in the first place.

A benevolent dictator might

argue that his government retains “legitimacy,” because its
decisions are grounded in a paternalistic effort to guide
those who, left on their own, would be unable to maximize
their welfare.

Thus, Post’s and Weinstein’s assertions of

legitimacy must first be grounded in an initial moral
commitment to self-determination — something they have
totally failed to do.

It is as if one is walking into a

movie theater in the middle of the movie.
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Yet if they were

to attempt to explain their implicit commitment to selfdetermination, two puzzling (and unanswered) questions
arise.

First, how do they define the scope of “public

discourse” in the first place?

Second, how do we determine

that Consumer Reports does contribute to “public
discourse,” but commercial advertising does not?
When every conceivably principled (or what I have
called internal) basis for discrimination against
commercial speech is shown to be irrationally
underinclusive, it is possible to draw only one of two
conceivable inferences: (1) the asserted bases of
distinction do not represent the true grounds for
exclusion, or (2) the First Amendment interpreter
mistakenly failed to recognize the illogical
underinclusiveness of the asserted basis of distinction.
It should be kept in mind, however, that discovering
irrational underinclusiveness is a classic method of
unearthing viewpoint-based discriminations.

Otherwise, the

prohibition on viewpoint discrimination could be easily
circumvented simply by invoking a form of legalized
sophistry.
Reliance on First Amendment intuitionism (or practical
reason) as a basis for exclusion of commercial speech from
the scope of the First Amendment gives rise to a more
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complex issue.

However, careful and critical analysis of

the entire nature of intuitionist constitutional thinking
leads to one of two conclusions: (1) the intuitionist label
disguises what is at its foundation a form of unprincipled
constitutional analysis that in reality represents a form
of viewpoint discrimination, or (2) the intuitionist
approach functions as an enabler, implementing broader preexisting societal hostility to or disdain for particular
types of expression.
Both intuitionism and practical reason, it should be
recalled, call for an analysis that turns on a nonsyllogistic form of contextual reaction to a given set of
circumstances.

While it is not entirely clear exactly what

either approach actually entails, it is clear what they do
not entail: application of pre-existing generalized
principles to specific fact situations.152

Absent this

intellectually disciplined form of inquiry, what remains
can be nothing beyond some synthesis of personal
impressions and instincts, untied to any effort to discern
enduring, generalized and consistently applied
constitutional principles from the document’s text,
structure, or history.

152

As a definitional matter, then, use

See discussion supra Part II.C.1-2.
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of intuitionism relies on the decision maker’s preexisting
prejudices, instincts, and predilections.

It is only a

small step from personal prejudices, instincts, and
predilections untied to a careful and reasoned analysis of
abstract constitutional principles to a decision grounded
in the decision maker’s viewpoint.
To the extent that practical reason seeks not to
implement the decision maker’s personal preferences but
rather those of society at large,153 it simply transforms
the source of the external viewpoint that is to be
implemented.

In so doing, practical reason effectively

turns the entire basis of the First Amendment on its head.
It would seem not to be a controversial proposition to
assert that the First Amendment is designed to protect the
assertion of unpopular views, positions, perspectives and
ideologies from suppression by the majority.

It is, then,

nonsensical to let the scope of First Amendment protection
turn on an assessment of the normative instincts of society
as a whole.

And this is so, even if we ignore the flawed

assumption implicit in this approach that somehow the
unrepresentative, unaccountable judiciary possesses an
empirical pipeline to popular perspectives.

153

See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
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It hardly

seems consistent with the foundations of the First
Amendment, for example, to suggest that during the
“pathological” periods of World War I, the post-World War I
“red scare” period, or the McCarthy era of the 1950s it was
appropriate for the judiciary to implement, through a
judicial assessment of public “sensibilities,” the strongly
held ideological prejudices of the majority.154
Reliance on intuitionism or practical reason to
justify the exclusion of commercial speech from the First
Amendment, then, is no more principled a form of
constitutional analysis than is reliance on superficially
principled but irrationally underinclusive bases of
distinction.

The fact that the decision maker’s reflexive

personal instincts, or the decision maker’s rump assessment
of societal predilections and preferences, suggest that
commercial speech is somehow not worthy of First Amendment
protection in no way removes such analysis from
characterization as invidious viewpoint discrimination.

154

Cf. Blasi, supra note 63, at 449-50 (espousing the view

that the First Amendment should function at its most
protective during times when intolerance of unorthodox
ideas pervades the social and political climate); Redish,
The Logic of Persecution, supra note 132, at 46-62.
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The most obvious form of viewpoint discrimination used
to justify reduced protection for commercial speech is open
and candid reliance on ideological disdain for
commercialism.155

When this transparent ideological disdain

is employed, we are left with the paradigmatic example of
twilight zone viewpoint discrimination.

In this situation,

it is true that normative preferences untied to any good
faith effort to decipher and apply the First Amendment’s
underlying values do not lead to discrimination premised on
either the preexisting ideological associations of the
speaker or the ideological positions taken in her speech.
The fact remains, however, that the decision to
discriminate against commercial speech in the reach of
constitutional protection is made on the grounds of the
decision maker’s personal ideological pre-disposition.

It

is difficult to imagine a more pathological undermining of
fundamental First Amendment values.

V. Conclusion

155

See discussion supra Part IV.A.

Professor Shiffrin’s

repeated expression of disdain for materialism at the oral
symposium qualifies quite nicely for this categorization, I
believe.

Shiffrin, Symposium Remarks.
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Several years ago, I authored a book entitled Money
Talks: Speech, Economic Power and the Values of
Democracy.156

In it, I argued that regulation of the use of

money as expression and the suppression of the speech of
those with money caused significant harm to the First
Amendment.

I gave a copy to an old friend and colleague

whose politics are far, far more conservative than my own.
After reading the book, he sent me the following brief but
pithy e-mail message: “Redish, I always knew you were a
closet Republican.”

Thinking I could educate him about the

differences between adherence to narrow personal political
beliefs on the one hand and implementation of the values of
constitutional process on the other, I sent back the
following reply: “The fact that I believe in the free
speech rights of corporations and commercial advertisers no
more means I am a Republican than the fact that individuals
supported the free speech rights of Communists in the 1940s
necessarily implied that they were Communists.”

He sent

back a single-sentence response: “Weren’t they?”
There are, I believe, two important lessons to be
learned from this anecdote.

First, it underscores both the

importance and the difficulty of separating personal

156

Redish, Money Talks, supra note 18.
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political and ideological preferences from comprehension of
the ideological humility central to a commitment to a
viable system of free expression.

No viable system of free

expression can survive where the guardian of the First
Amendment determines protection on the basis of the
speech’s consistency with her own ideological
predilections.

Second, it demonstrates the close — and

often unrecognized — link between commercial speech and
political ideology.

Commercial speech, as defined by both

the Court and hostile commentators, does not include all
speech concerning commercial products and services.

As

previously noted,157 none of the scholarly opponents of
commercial speech protection would suggest that Ralph
Nader’s criticisms of the Chevrolet Corvair’s safety or New
York Times columnist Bob Herbert’s criticisms of Nike’s
foreign production process fall into the category of less
protected commercial speech.

However, when Chevrolet

defends the safety of its product or Nike denies the
charges about its use of sweatshop labor, somehow the
expression is magically transformed into lesser protected
commercial speech.

157

It is, then, only advocacy on the part

See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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of commercial enterprises about its products and services
that is deemed less deserving of constitutional protection.
The point of this Article has been to connect the
constitutional and political dots.

It has been wrongly

assumed by many that the arguments for excluding commercial
speech from the scope of the First Amendment represent
plausible contributions to the debate over the shaping and
application of constitutional principles gleaned from
analysis of the normative foundations of free expression.
It has also been wrongly assumed that commercial speech may
appropriately be excluded from the First Amendment’s scope
without undermining any fundamental constitutional values,
because commercial speech is, at best, only peripheral to
those values.

Ironically, the inaccuracy of both of these

assumptions is best underscored by seeing the link between
these two flawed assumptions about commercial speech: the
very fact that many wish to exclude commercial speech from
protection on grounds completely ignored when relevant to
other types or subjects of speech actually suggests the
invidious political and ideological presumptions often
underlying the attacks on commercial speech.
When, in the 1940s and 50s, scholars opposed
constitutional protection for the speech of Communists,
they often did so on the basis of an ideological world view
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that found such expression ideologically offensive.158
Hopefully, if an identical political situation were to
arise today, cooler heads in the world of free speech
scholarship would prevail and recognize that ideological
hostility to the views of Communists cannot properly be
used as a basis to exclude their speech from the First
Amendment’s scope.

And this is true, whether we seek to

achieve that end by irrationally (or strategically)
selective use of more principled grounds, vague notions of
intuitionism or practical reason, or open reliance on
contrary ideology.
To be sure, hostility to commercial speech is probably
one step removed from hostility to Communist expression,
because the suppressed speech is not, standing alone, what
is deemed offensive by the regulators.

However, I have

demonstrated here that where the speech is suppressed
because of the regulators’ hostility to the “ideological
ether” that pervades the regulated speech and speaker, the

158

See, e.g., Carl Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of

1954: A Proposed Legal – Political Theory of Free Speech,
23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 173, 217-20 (1956) (arguing that the
passage of the Communist Control Act of 1954 does not
constitute an abandonment of democratic principles).
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harms to First Amendment values are just as great.

It is

time to recognize opposition to commercial speech
protection for what it all too often is: a form of
ideological hostility to the premises of capitalism and
commercialism.

As was true of those who sought to protect

the free speech rights of Communists in the mid-twentieth
century, one surely need not agree with the ideological
premises underlying either capitalism in general or the
commercial speech sought to be regulated in particular to
find such suppression ominous.
In the oral symposium that gave rise to this issue of
the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Professor Weinstein,
commenting on a prior draft of this Article, suggested that
in effect I was calling all those jurists and scholars who
oppose full protection for commercial speech “either fools
or knaves.”159

Certainly, those terms would not have been

my choice as to how to describe my conclusion.

But

consider once again the hypothetical ordinance making it a
crime to burn the American flag.

Assume that a scholar or

jurist seeks to justify this ordinance on the grounds that

159

James Weinstein, Remarks at the Loyola of Los Angeles

Law Review Symposium: Commercial Speech: Past, Present, and
Future (Feb. 24, 2007).
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the burning of the American flag would give rise to a
serious fire hazard, completely ignoring the absurd
underinclusiveness that characterizes such an argument.
How should one describe those who make such a nonsensical
argument: as a fool, because they mistakenly fail to see
the obvious point that burning the Iranian or North Korean
flags give rise to the exact same danger, or as a knave,
because of the thinly disguised viewpoint-based and
manipulative nature of the argument?
The only exception, I suppose, would be those scholars
or jurists who are consistent in what I consider their
underprotection of expression.

The line of demarcation, as

I have suggested throughout this Article, is whether the
scholar or jurist who opposes full protection for
commercial speech would simultaneously extend full
protection to Consumer Reports.

Those who believe in a

narrowly political version of the First Amendment — for
example, Judge Bork, and perhaps Professor Weinstein
himself — would logically exclude from full protection both
commercial advertising and Consumer Reports.

While I would

certainly disagree with so narrow a perspective on the
First Amendment’s scope, I could not reasonably
characterize their positions as either discriminatory or
viewpoint based.

The same, however, could clearly not be
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said of those who seek to distinguish between the two.
Whether well intentioned or not, scholars and jurists who
would simultaneously extend full constitutional protection
to Consumer Reports but fail to do the same for promotional
commercial speech are, in fact, guilty of something.

They

have either failed to grasp the absence of any principled
constitutional distinction between the two, or have
intentionally sought to impose non-existent distinctions
for narrow ideological reasons.

For reasons explained in

this Article, neither represents an acceptable approach to
First Amendment interpretation.
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